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INSURANCE LAW
by
R. Brent Cooper* and Michael W. Huddleston **
I. ExcEss LIABILITY
A. Stowers Liability
N the past year Texas courts addressed important issues with respect to
the scope and procedural application of Stowers liability. Many previ-
ously unanswered issues have been addressed and, if not resolved, have
been analyzed. These cases reveal that Texas is very much becoming a
prominent jurisdiction in explaining and promulgating bad faith insurance
law.
1. Claim by "Other" Insurer
In Foremost County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Home Indemnity Co. I the
Fifth Circuit faced a case of first impression under Texas law regarding ex-
cess liability. In Foremost the insured killed an individual while driving a
motor home. Home Indemnity Company (Home) insured the defendant
through a general liability policy with $250,000 in coverage and a worker's
compensation policy. Foremost County Mutual Insurance Company (Fore-
most) issued an automobile liability policy with limits of $250,000. The
Plaintiff tendered the claim to both companies for a defense. Home agreed
to defend under its worker's compensation policy, but Foremost refused to
defend. Prior to trial, Home's lawyers drafted a covenant to execute which
the estates of the decedent executed. In the covenant, the insured assigned
the plaintiffs any and all its rights of action against Foremost. At trial,
Home failed to question any of the plaintiff witnesses and the trial court
rendered a judgment against the defendant in the amount of $3,797,000.2
Following the trial, Foremost settled its claims with the plaintiffs for
$3,200,000 and sought recovery of that amount from Home through subro-
* B.B.A., Texas A & M University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Cowles & Thompson, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Texas A & M University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Cowles & Thompson, Dallas, Texas.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of J. Stephen Gibson, Judith H. Winston,
Charles T. Frazier, R. Michael Northrup, Veronica M. Bates and Teresa G. Bohne, Attorneys
at Law, members of the Appellate and Insurance Section of Cowles & Thompson, in the prepa-
ration of this Article.
1. 897 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 902 F.2d 955.
2. Id. at 758.
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gation and/or contribution. 3 The trial court ordered that Home pay Fore-
most half of the $3,200,000 settlement, holding Home liable for negligently
failing to settle the case within its policy limits.4
The Fifth Circuit held that Foremost failed to prove all of the essential
elements for a Stowers case.5 The court held that the mere refusal to accept
a settlement offer alone does not give rise to a Stowers action, but the refusal
to settle must also have been negligent and have caused harm to the in-
sured.6 The court held that since Home obtained a covenant not to execute
on behalf of its insured, Home's decision to refuse the settlement offer never
resulted in injury to its insured and therefore no breach of any duty to the
insured existed.7
Foremost argued that the court ignored prior Texas cases holding that a
covenant not to execute drafted and executed by an insured with their in-
surer does not release the insurance carrier from liability.8 The Fifth Circuit
rejected this argument for two separate reasons. 9 First, the court held that
the right to sue a carrier for a Stowers claim belongs exclusively to the in-
sured and may only be prosecuted by a third party claimant pursuant to an
assignment.' 0 In Foremost the insurer lacked an enforceable assignment
from the insured and therefore had no standing to bring a lawsuit under
Texas case law." Secondly, the court held that the extension of the Stowers
rule to the case before it would not serve the policy the courts attempted to
advance in YMCA v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co. 12 when they cre-
ated the rule that a covenant not to execute does not relieve the insurer of
liability.' 3 The court explained that the purpose of the YMCA rule was to
prevent an insurer from escaping liability by treating the policy as one of
indemnity rather than liability. 14
2. Guidelines for Determination of Negligence
In Stroman v. Fidelity & Casualty of New York Is the insurer defended the
insured pursuant to a reservation of rights letter. The insurer refused to
settle the claim within the policy limits and suggested that the insured settle
the claim on their own behalf. When the case was called for trial, the in-
3. Id. at 756.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 757.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 757-58.
8. See YMCA v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 552 S.W.2d 497, 504-05 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 563 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1978).
9. Foremost, 897 F.2d at 758.
10. Id.
11. Id.; see Whatley v. City of Dallas, 758 S.W.2d 301, 308-09 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988,
writ denied).
12. 552 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 563
S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1978).
13. Foremost, 897 F.2d at 758-59.
14. Id.
15. 792 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
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sured and tort claimant entered into an agreed judgment for $400,000, some
$300,000 in excess of the policy limits.
The tort claimant later fied suit pursuant to an assignment of the in-
sured's right of action against the insurer. The trial court granted the in-
surer summary judgment on the Stowers claim. The court of appeals
reversed, basing its reversal upon correspondence from the insurer advising
that the case should be negotiated from the standpoint of the insured if pos-
sible. 16 Importantly, the court held that the insurer's belief that coverage did
not exist failed to insulate the insurer from liability under Stowers.1' The
court of appeals set forth the following guidelines for determining if an in-
surer is negligent in failing to accept an offer to settle: if there exists 1) an
opportunity to settle during the course of investigation or trial; 2) a failure to
carry on negotiations to settle or make a counter offer after receipt of an
offer to settle; 3) a failure to investigate all the facts necessary to protect
properly the insured against liability; 4) if liability is clear, a greater duty to
settle may exist; 5) whether the insurer acts negligently, fraudulently, or in
bad faith; and 6) if there are conflicts in the evidence which increase the
uncertainty of the insured's defense to the injured party's claim, the possibil-
ity of the insurer being held negligent increases.' 8
A second issue raised by the plaintiff in Stroman was whether the insurer
could attack the reasonableness of the damages awarded in excess of the
policy limits. The plaintiff asserted that under Employers Casualty Co. v.
Block 19 and Ranger Insurance Co. v. Rogers2" the insurer cannot collaterally
attack the agreed judgment by litigating the reasonableness of the damages.
The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that the damages, if
any, which were caused by the failure of an insurer to settle within its policy
limits constituted a question of fact for the jury rather than a question of law
for the trial court.21
B. Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code
1. Jury Submission
In Spencer v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. 22 the court faced the issue of what
16. Id. at 261.
17. Id.
18. Id. (following Globe Indem. Co. v. Gen-Aero, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1970), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 469 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1971)).
19. 744 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1988).
20. 530 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. Stroman, 792 S.W.2d at 261 (following William M. Mercer, Inc. v. Woods, 717
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986), aff'd in part, 769 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1988)). The
court in William M. Mercer was not the first court to address the issue of whether the existence
of the judgment alone establishes damages as a matter of law. The Texas Supreme Court in
Montfort v. Jeter, 567 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1978), stated that "the uncontradicted evidence at the
trial is that the unpaid judgment was still 'hanging over [the head of the insured].'" Id. at 499.
The court held that "[u]nder the judgment rule adopted in Hernandez, the existing judgment
against Montfort is some evidence of actual damages." Id. at 500. The Montfort court, like the
Stroman court, refused to hold that the proof of the underlying judgment established damages
as a matter of law.
22. 780 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ)
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acts are actionable under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code and the Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act. In Spencer a fire destroyed the insured's business.
The insureds made a claim on the policy for a loss of the building's contents
as well as a loss of earnings. The insurer paid contents loss on a timely basis,
but a tender of the business interruption loss was not made until after suit
had been filed to recover payment.
At trial, the question posed to the jury was whether the handling of the
business interruption claim by the insurer constituted an unfair practice in
the business of insurance.23 The jury answered affirmatively. The trial
court, in response to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
concluded that the jury answer to the question posed would not support a
judgment against the defendant. 24 The court therefore rendered a take noth-
ing judgment against the plaintiffs.25
On appeal, the insured argued that the jury's answer in fact would support
a judgment in their favor pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 26 The court of appeals
rejected the contention of the insured, holding that such a finding did not
meet the requirements of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code.27 The
court noted that in Vail the supreme court enumerated three categories of
conduct under article 21.21 which would result in liability to an insurer: 1)
practices declared to be unfair in section 4 of article 21.21; 2) conduct de-
fined in Insurance Board rules or regulations as "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the business of insurance"; and 3) any practice defined by section
17.46 of the DTPA as an unlawful deceptive trade practice.28
The court reviewed the acts and practices declared to be unfair in section
4 of article 21.21 and determined that these related to unfair competition
between insurance companies.29 As a result, the court held that none of
these acts would afford a basis for recovery to the plaintiffs in the case.
Addressing the second category of conduct defined in the State Board of
Insurance Rules and Regulations as unfair or deceptive acts and practices in
the business of insurance, the court noted two potential sources of liability
under these provisions. First, a practice that is defined by the Insurance
Code or other rules and regulations promulgated by the State Board of In-
surance may be deemed an unfair or deceptive trade practice.30 The second
alternative is an activity determined pursuant to case law to be an unfair or
deceptive trade practice in the insurance business) ! After conducting a re-
view of the Insurance Code and regulations adopted by the State Board of
23. The court defined "unfair practice" to mean "any act or series of acts which is arbi-
trary, without justification, or takes advantage of a person to the extent that an unjust or
inequitable result is obtained." Id. at 838-39.
24. Id. at 830.
25. Id.
26. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
27. Spencer, 780 S.W.2d at 830.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 840.
31. Id.
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Insurance, the court concluded that the definition of unfair practice submit-
ted to the jury was not encompassed in any rule or regulation. Further, the
court held that such practice did not constitute an activity determined by
case law to be an unfair or deceptive act in the insurance business. 32
The third category of conduct which may result in liability to an insurer is
any practice defined by section 17.46 of the DTPA as an unlawful deceptive
trade practice. The Spencer court noted that Vail makes actionable not
merely the "laundry list" items from section 17.46(b) but also unlisted prac-
tices pursuant to section 17.46(a).33 The insured in Spencer argued that the
finding made by the jury constituted an unlisted practice under section
17.46(a), entitling it to a judgment. The court of appeals rejected the plain-
tiffs' argument because the plaintiffs failed to secure a finding that the act or
practice occurred and that it was deceptive, as required by Vail.34
The Eastland court of appeals reached similar conclusions in Win. H. Mc-
Gee & Co. v. Schick.35 In McGee the court determined that the insurer had
engaged in "unfair and/or deceptive acts or practices in the handling of [the]
Plaintiff's claim." 36 The Eastland court reviewed the Vail decision and de-
termined that the current finding was not a holding that the insurer engaged
in any of the practices declared to be unfair or deceptive, by article 21.21,
section 4.37
The court likewise found that the jury's answer did not find that the in-
surer had engaged in conduct defined in the rules and regulations adopted by
the State Board of Insurance under article 21.21 as a method of unfair com-
petition or a deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. 38 Finally,
the court concluded that the wording of the jury question would not support
a finding that the insurer had engaged in any practice defined as an unlawful,
deceptive practice by the DTPA. 39 The court noted that unlawful deceptive
trade practices were defined by the DTPA in section 17.46 to be "false, mis-
leading, or deceptive acts or practices." 4° The court held that a finding of
unfairness in the handling of the claim would not constitute a deceptive act
or practice. 41 The court in McGee took a position contrary to that of the
Spencer court and held that "unlisted" acts or practices under section
17.46(a) are not made actionable under section 16 of Article 21.21.42
2. Bad Faith
In Allied General Agency, Inc. v. Moody43 the insured alleged, among
32. Id. at 842.
33. Id. (citing Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 135).
34. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 135.
35. 792 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, no writ).
36. Id. at 517.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 518.
41. Id. at 517.
42. Id. at 518.
43. 788 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
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other things, various violations of the DTPA, article 21.21 of the Insurance
Code and the breach of the insurers' duty of good faith and fair dealing with
regard to their insured." The jury found that the insurer breached the duty
of good faith and fair dealing. Based upon this finding, the trial court
awarded the insured his actual damages plus additional damages pursuant to
article 21.21.45 On appeal the Allied court concluded that a common law
cause of action may serve as the basis for a violation of section 16, article
21.21 of the Insurance Code so as to entitle the insured to actual damages
plus punitive damages of two times the amount of actual damages. 6
C. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
1. Statute of Limitations
In Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc.47 the Texas Supreme Court took
the opportunity to re-examine the accrual date for a breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing cause of action for purposes of the commence-
ment of the limitations period. In Murray the Ector County Independent
School District established a self-funded group medical insurance program
for its employees and their dependents. San Jacinto agency administered
this program. In*the summer of 1984, the plaintiff sought coverage for treat-
ment of a condition. Because her husband had earlier requested that she be
dropped from the policy, the San Jacinto Agency refused to verify coverage
to the health provider for the plaintiff. Later, on March 15, 1985, the San
Jacinto Agency reversed its position and reinstated coverage retroactive to
the Spring of 1984.
The plaintiff filed suit against the San Jacinto Agency on March 27, 1986,
alleging only negligent denial of coverage. Citation was not served upon the
defendant until January 21, 1987. The plaintiff did not plead breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing claim until September 2, 1987. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of San Jacinto Agency based upon
limitations. The court of appeals affirmed.4 8
The issue before the supreme court was when the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion accrued. The agency argued that the accrual date should be September
5, 1984, the date the insurer denied coverage. Murray argued that the date
of accrual should be March 15, 1985, the date the San Jacinto Agency ad-
mitted that the denial was unwarranted.
Prior to Murray, the court held in Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire
Insurance Co.49 that the statute of limitation does not accrue on a duty of
good faith and fair dealing claim until the underlying contract claims are
finally resolved.50 The court in Murray determined that the accrual date set
44. Id. at 603.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 604.
47. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 404 (Apr. 18, 1990).
48. Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 759 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1988), rev'd,
33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 404 (Apr. 18, 1990).
49. 725 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex. 1987).
50. Id.
[Vol. 45
INSURANCE LAW
forth in Arnold could not withstand traditional scrutiny and modified it to
provide that the limitations period commences on a duty of good faith and
fair dealing claim on the date the insured first suffers an injury, which in
Murray was the date of denial.51
The court gave four reasons for, its modification of the Arnold decision.
First, the court noted that under existing Texas authority, the statute of limi-
tations begins to run when facts exist which would authorize the claimant to
seek a judicial remedy.5 2 The fact that additional damages may be sustained
after the accrual date of the statute of limitations does not prevent the limita-
tions period from commencing.5 3 Once a denial of a claim has taken place,
the insured may seek judicial relief.54
Second, the purpose of a statute of limitations is to afford plaintiffs a rea-
sonable time to present their claims and protect defendants and the court
from having their case seriously impaired by loss of evidence, death or disap-
pearance of witness, or disappearance of documents.55 The court noted that
under the Arnold accrual date, if the San Jacinto Agency had never admitted
coverage, the contract claim never would have been "finally resolved," and
theoretically, limitations would have never commenced.5 6
Third, the court held that the use of the date of the denial of a claim is
consistent with the well-established precedent in other jurisdictions. s7
Finally, the Murray court noted that Arnold incorrectly relied upon
Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co.,58 which was a Stowers
case. The court noted that the injury producing event in a Stowers's third
party action differs from that in a first party case.59 In a Stowers case, the
injury producing event is typically the underlying judgment in excess of the
policy limits. In a first party case, however, the injury producing event
occurs at the very least when the insurer unreasonably fails to pay an insured
under the policy.6°
2. Timeframe for Determining Good Faith
In Viles v. Security National Insurance Co.6 1 the insureds filed a claim
under their homeowner's policy to recover for damages caused to the wood
portions of their foundation. The policy required the insured to file a proof
51. Murray, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 405-06.
52. Id. (citing Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 19 (rex. 1977)).
53. Id (citing Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 153 (rex. 1967)).
54. Id. The court faced only a wrongful denial claim in Murray. The court's opinion, by
relying on the "some injury" rule, clearly dictates that in a case involving a wrongful delay in
making payment limitations runs whenever payment should have been made or whenever
some injury is suffered as a result of the delay. Id. at 406. The court recognized that if the
insurer "strings an insured along without denying or paying a claim," limitations will be tolled
under the doctrines of equitable estoppel or fraudulent concealment. Id. n.2.
55. Id at 405.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 406.
58. 260 S.W.2d 884 (rex. 1953).
59. Murray, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 407.
60. Id.
61. 788 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1990).
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of loss with the insurer within ninety days of the loss. The insurer denied the
claim prior to the time the proof of loss was due. The insurer subsequently
filed proof of loss late.
Insureds filed suit for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The jury answered the questions favorably to the insured and the trial court
rendered judgment based upon the verdict.62 On appeal, the court of ap-
peals reversed, holding that the insureds failed to obtain a jury finding pro-
viding that they had timely filed a proof of loss. 63
The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, stating
that the jury, in a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
must decide whether there was a reasonable basis for denial of the claim or
delay in payment of the claim.64 The court held that whether a reasonable
basis for denial exists must be viewed as of the time the claim is denied. 65 As
such, in Viles, the proof of loss was not due the insurer at the time the claim
was denied by the insurer. Therefore, the insureds' failure to file the proof of
loss could not have been a proper basis for a denial of the claim by the
insurer. 66
3. Res Judicata
In Marino v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.67 the Texas
Supreme Court faced the issue of the application of res judicata in cases tried
prior to the expansion of the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing to in-
surer-insured relationships. The insured in Marino had filed a suit against
State Farm alleging that the insurer wrongfully denied the insured's claim
for losses resulting from fire. In the earlier lawsuit, the insured made a claim
not only in connection with the loss of the house but also for State Farm's
alleged false, misleading and deceptive acts or practices in its dealings with
the insured.68 The insured asserted that State Farm acted unconscionably
by taking advantage of his lack of knowledge, ability, experience, and capac-
ity so as to result in a gross disparity between the value received and the
consideration paid. State Farm denied the claim contending that the insured
had set the fire intentionally to collect the insurance proceeds. The jury
failed to find that the insured had set fire to his house and awarded the
plaintiff the amount of the damage to the house and its contents. 69 The jury
did not receive issues regarding State Farm's dealings with the insured and
its handling of his claim. The court rendered judgment in favor of the in-
sured for the amount of his loss plus attorney's fees but refused to make an
award for the handling of the claim.70
62. Id. at 567.
63. Security Nat'1 Ins. Co. v. Viles, 773 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989), rev'd,
788 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1990).
64. Viles, 788 S.W.2d at 567.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 567-68.
67. 787 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. 1990).
68. Id. at 949.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 949.
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The insured later filed a second suit against State Farm, alleging that State
Farm breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in handling his claim.
The trial court granted State Farm summary judgment on the basis of res
judicata.71 The Fort Worth court of appeals held that the doctrine of res
judicata barred relitigation of all issues which could have been tried in the
earlier trial.72 The court held that the cause of action for the insurer's
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing it owes its insured grew out
of the same operative facts as the claims asserted by the insured in the first
suit concerning violations of the Texas Insurance Code and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act and could have been litigated in the first suit.
73
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals. The court reasoned that
the insured's bad faith claim was based on rights subsequently acquired by
the insured; thus, it could not have been part of the former action and would
not be barred by res judicata.74 The supreme court noted that it had previ-
ously held that a judgment in one suit will not operate as res judicata to
another suit on the same question between the same parties where in the
interval the facts have changed or new facts have occurred which alter the
legal rights or relationships of the parties.75 The court noted that it had
broadened this rule so as to apply it to situations where changes in statutory
or decisional law had occurred in the interval.76 The court noted that the
duty of good faith owed insured parties by insurers was not adopted until a
few weeks after the trial of the first action in Marino.77 The court noted the
judicial adoption of this duty of good faith not only conferred the rights
upon the insured but also created a new common law cause of action 73 and
that the prior trial therefore would not operate as res judicata.79
71. Id.
72. Marino v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 774 S.W.2d 107 (rex. App.,Fort
Worth 1989), rev'd, 787 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. 1990).
73. Id. at 109.
74. Marino, 787 S.W.2d at 950.
75. Id. at 949-50 (citing City of Lubbock v. Stubbs, 160 Tex. 111, 114, 327 S.W.2d 411,
414 (1959); Cowling v. Colligan, 158 Tex. 458, 461, 312 S.W.2d 943, 947 (1958)).
76. Id. at 950 (citing Powell v. Powell, 703 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Colorado County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lewis, 498 S.W.2d 723, 731 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Murchard v. Berenson, 307 F.2d 368, 369-70 (5th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962, 83 S. Ct. 541, 9 L. ed. 2d 509 (1962)).
77. See Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (rex. 1987).
78. Marino, 787 S.W.2d at 950.
79. Id. at 950. The decision in Marino cannot be reconciled with other decisions of the
supreme court regarding changes in the law. In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d
414 (rex. 1984), the supreme court by judicial fiat imposed a new scheme of comparative
causation. However, because the defendant had not raised the new scheme in its pleadings and
offered no evidence to support a recovery under the scheme, the court denied the defendant the
benefit of the change in the law. The court ruled that the defendant was required to anticipate
the change-in the law and raise the change in its pleadings and evidence. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d
at 432-34; see Sanchez v. Schinder, 651 S.W.2d 249, 255 (rex. 1983). In Marino when the case
initially went to trial the application for writ of error in Arnold had been granted, the case had
been argued, and the decision was pending. The opinion in Arnold was handed down approxi-
mately two weeks after the trial setting in Marino. Furthermore, in the initial trial setting of
Marino, the plaintiff had article 21.21 and DTPA claims in his pleadings but chose not to
submit them. Marino, 787 S.W.2d at 949. Nothing in the record in Marino would indicate
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
4. Duty to Third Parties
In Caserotti v. State Farm Insurance Co. 80 the Dallas court of appeals
faced the issue of how far the duty of good faith and fair dealing should be
extended. This case arose out of a vehicular collision in which State Farm
insured both vehicles. The owner of one vehicle sued the other for damages
resulting from the collision. Neither notified State Farm of the suit. The
trial court entered a default judgment in the plaintiff's favor.81 Later, State
Farm became aware of the lawsuit and hired an attorney to set aside the
default. The attorney successfully had the default set aside and asserted a
defense to the claim based upon the doctrine of release.8 2 Soon thereafter,
the underlying tort claimant filed suit against State Farm alleging, among
other things, that it breached its fiduciary duty toward her and the duty of
good faith and fair dealing it owed her.83 The trial court rendered summary
judgment in favor of State Farm.84
The court of appeals held that State Farm did not owe a duty of good faith
and fair dealing to the underlying tort claimant with respect to the handling
of the liability claim.85 The court first noted that all cases imposing the duty
of good faith and fair dealing involve first-party claims; that is, suits by in-
sureds against their insurer under the insureds' policies for loss to the in-
sureds' own person or property. The plaintiff in Caserotti claimed that State
Farm owed her and the defendant the same duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing since both were insured by State Farm. 86 The court rejected this argu-
ment, noting that the plaintiff did not allege that she was denied benefits
under her own insurance policy but complained of the denial of benefits
under the policy issued to the defendant, a third-party claim.87 The court
concluded that an insurer does not owe the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing to its insured when that insured asserts a third party claim against an-
other insured of the same company. 88
that the plaintiff would have chosen to submit a claim for the breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing had the trial court recognized such a duty existed.
80. 791 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1990, writ denied).
81. Id. at 563.
82. Id. at 564.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 562.
85. Id. at 566.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. The Caserotti court follows two prior Texas courts holding that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing does not run between a liability carrier and the third-party claimant.
Hart v. Aetna Casualty Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ); Chaffin
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). The rule adopted by Texas is in line with the majority rule in other jurisdictions.
See Vickey v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 693, 694 (Ala. 1984) (attempt-
ing to recover from automobile insurer per perished auto damaged in collision with insured
vehicle); Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 940, 553 P.2d 584, 586, 132 Cal. Rptr.
424, 426 (1976) (seeking balance of wrongful death judgment from insurer of tort fusia); Eich-
ler v. Scott Pools, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (seeking damages from
automobile accident in which plaintiff's parents were insureds); Linscott v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Me. 1977) (charging deceit and misrepresentation by
tortfeasor insured); Magalski v. Maryland Casualty Co., 21 Md. App. 136, 141, 318 A.2d 843,
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The plaintiff in Caserotti also alleged that State Farm breached a fiduciary
duty owed to her. The court rejected this contention, holding that proof of a
fiduciary relationship requires more than evidence of prior dealings between
the parties and the subjective trust of one party.89 The court noted that no
Texas cases exist that recognize the existence of a fiduciary relationship be-
tween an insured and his insurer and, as a result, the court refused to allow
such a remedyY°
5. Attorney as Witness
In Warrilow v. Norrell9l the attorney for the plaintiff testified as an expert
witness in the trial of the case and also served as an attorney. The insurer in
that case filed a motion to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel on the grounds
that he was a material fact witness as well as a designated expert. The trial
court denied their motions.92 The court of appeals held that the trial court
erred.93
The court noted that Disciplinary Rule 5-102(a) requires the lawyer to
withdraw if it is obvious he would be called as a witness on behalf of his
client.94 The court further noted four exceptions to the mandatory with-
drawal rule: 1) if the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter;
2) if the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality, and there is no
reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the
testimony; 3) if the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of
legal services rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the client; 4)
as to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the client
because of the distinct value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in a particu-
lar case.95 In Warrilow the attorney testified regarding a non-waiver agree-
ment as well as conversations regarding the denial of coverage. The court
held that in light of the testimony as to conversations between the parties,
the attorney should have been disqualified.96
The court next addressed the issue of whether an attorney may testify as
an expert witness in a bad faith case. The court noted several problems cre-
ated when an attorney testifies as an expert witness in a case. First, the jury
may be unable to distinguish among attorney's multiple roles, including
849 (1974) (claiming damages for tortfeasor insures refusal to pay property damage); Chavez
v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 429, 553 P.2d 703, 709 (Ct. App. 1976) (claiming against defend-
ant's insurer for unreasonable delay); D. H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. v. American Home
Assurance Co., 29 Ohio App. 3d 31, 34, 502 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1986) (claiming against attor-
ney's liability insurer); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381, 386, 715 P.2d
1133, 1139 (1986) (claiming against insurer of defendant in assault action); see also Cooper and
Huddleston, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 343, 350-51 (1989).
89. Caserotti, 791 S.W.2d at 564.
90. Id.
91. 791 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
92. Id. at 519.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Supreme Court of Texas, Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas, Article X, § 9
(Vernon 1988).
96. Warrilow, 791 S.W.2d at 520.
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those of 1) an expert on the ultimate legal issues, 2) a critical fact witness on
the issue of good faith and fair dealing, 3) an attorney responsible for up-
holding the standards of ethical conduct, and 4) a representative of a party
to the suit.97 Secondly, the court noted that such testimony puts the attor-
ney-witness in the position of having to vouch for his own credibility when
summing up to the jury.98
Finally, the court recognized that a danger exists that the trier of fact,
especially a jury, will tend to grant undue weight to the attorney's testimony
and thereby disadvantage the opponent.99 The court found that the admis-
sion of the attorney's testimony was calculated to cause and probably did
cause a rendition of an improper judgment. 10
II. LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. Legal Obligation to Pay/Estoppel
In State Farm Lloyds, Ina v. Williams 101 the Dallas court of appeals, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Enoch, addressed the meaning of the standard
liability policy language requiring the insurer to pay "all sums which the
Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily
injury."10 2 In Williams Claude Fulton shot his wife, his step-grandaughter,
his step-daughter and then himself.103 The step-daughter and her husband
brought a wrongful death and personal injury suit against the estate of
Claude Fulton and that of his wife. The alleged basis of liability against the
wife's estate was section 5.61(d) of the Texas Family Code. 104 The court
entered judgment against the wife's estate to the extent of her community
property, including the homeowner's liability policy issued to her and her
husband by State Farm.105 After an assignment by the wife's estate, the
claimants in the underlying suit brought a bad faith action against State
Farm. The claimants convinced the district court to grant summary judg-
ment, holding State Farm liable under the policy as a matter of law.106
The court of appeals held that the resolution of the case required compari-
son of the judgment in the underlying tort suit to the policy terms. 107 The
court found the judgment ambiguous, leading it to consider the record of the
underlying trial and judgment to determine the nature of liability, if any,
97. Id. at 521.
98. Id. at 522.
99. Warrilow, 791 S.W.2d at 523. But see Ayres v. Canaes, 790 S.W.2d 554, 557-58 (Tex.
1990) (requiring proof of actual prejudice resulting from continued representation).
100. Warrilow, 791 S.W.2d at 523.
101. 791 S.W.2d 542, 549 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
102. This portion of the policy was set forth under the heading "Coverage D-Personal
Liability." Id. at 545.
103. Id.
104. Section 5.61(d) provides that "[c]ommunity property is subject to tortious liability of
either spouse incurred during marriage." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(d) (Vernon 1975).
105. Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 547.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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imposed.10 8 The court concluded that the claim was based on sections
5.61(d) and 4.031 of the Texas Family Code. 109 The court noted that section
5.61(d) subjects only the community property to the liability of the other
spouse, and section 4.031(a) imposes personal liability on one spouse for the
torts of the other only if there is proof of agency.' 10 The court found the
judgment against the wife's estate did not impose a legal obligation to pay as
damages as a result of personal liability; instead, the court found that a judg-
ment under section 5.61(d) merely imposes an obligation on the community
property for the personal liability of the other spouse.11
The court distinguished Walker v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.," 12
relied upon by the claimants, by noting that the Walker court imposed per-
sonal liability against parents who sought coverage, not merely against their
community property, for the willful torts of their children. 113 The coverage
determination made by the Dallas court is consistent with the few prior deci-
sions in other jurisdictions." 14
The court in Williams also addressed the issue of presumptive prejudice in
108. Id.
109. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.031 (Vernon Supp. 1990); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 5.61(d) (Vernon 1975).
110. Id.
111. Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 548. The court found that a seemingly contrary holding in
Lawrence v. Hardy, 583 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), was erroneous in light of prior supreme court authority that a husband was not individ-
ually liable for the torts of the wife which were not aided and abetted by the husband. Wil-
liams, 791 S.W.2d at 548. The court also found that Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Burch, 426 S.W.2d
306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 442 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1968),
which suggested that the liability of community property invoked liability insurance coverage,
was dictum and erroneously based on the previously rejected rule that a husband is always
personally liable for the wife's torts. Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 548.
112. 491 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no writ).
113. Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 549; Walker, 491 S.W.2d at 697-99 (citing Tax. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5923-1 (Vernon 1962) (repealed 1973) (current version at TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 33.01-33.03 (Vernon 1986))). The Williams court noted that this statute presup-
posed parental control, which was not done by 5.61(d) with respect to the relationship of
spouses. Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 549.
114. See, eg., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 406, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 37 (1983) (holding that "relationship or marital status of the [insureds] gave rise to no
independently insurable event which would place this case beyond the aircraft exclusions in
the policies"); Evans v. Pacific Indem. Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 537, 540, 122 Cal. Rptr. 680, 683
(1975) (holding that "legal obligation to pay as damages" requirement not met by liability of
one spouse's property for intentional torts of another; judgment was not actually rendered
against the innocent spouse); U.S.F. & G. Ins. Co. v. Brannan, 22 Wa. App. 341, 347, 589 P.2d
817, 823 (1979) (holding that allowing coverage for innocent spouse would benefit the commu-
nity and therefore benefit the guilty spouse and would therefore be contrary to public policy).
The court in Williams rejected attempted distinctions of Evans on the basis that Williams
involved a judgment entered against the innocent spouse, whereas Evans involved no such
judgment. The court apparently reached this decision because of the fact that an innocent
spouse need not even be joined in the suit against the guilty spouse in order for his or her
community property to be subject to collection. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.04 (Vernon 1975);
I DORSANEO, TEXAS LmGATioN GUIDE § 12.03 [3], 12-10-12-11 (1989); see Lawrence v.
Hardy, 583 S.W.2d 795 (Ci.--San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that husband may
be sued alone without joinder of tortfeasor wife). The court in Williams apparently concluded
that the responsibility of the community property for the husband's tort existed under the
statute; that statute, like the one in Evans, did not create separate and personal liability on the
part of the innocent spouse. Thus, the judgment could do no more than the statute.
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the context of the application of estoppel for failure of the insurer to reserve
its rights prior to defending a claim against its insured. In Williams State
Farm provided a reservation of rights letter to the estate of Claude Fulton,
but it did not provide a separate one to the estate of the wife.'1 5 The court
held that while generally waiver and estoppel cannot be used to create insur-
ance'coverage where none otherwise exists, an exception exists if the "in-
surer assumes an insured's defense without declaring a reservation of rights
or obtaining a non-waiver agreement, and with knowledge of facts indicating
non-coverage .... ,",16 The court rejected arguments that the decision of the
Texas Supreme Court in Texas Farmers Insurance Company v. McGuire 117
dispensed with the so-called exception.' 18
In Williams the court held that the exception requires a showing that the
insured was harmed or prejudiced by the insurer's assumption of the defense
without reservation.119 The Williams court rejected the estate's arguments
that prejudice is conclusively presumed from the mere fact that the insured
is deprived of the right to control his defense and the insurer is defending
with a conflict of interest. 120 The court recognized that at least one Texas
case had held that "the mere existence of a conflict of interests may be
enough to demonstrate harm." 121 The court refused an automatic presump-
tion, holding instead that the insured must show he was harmed unless a
conflict of interest or other harm is obvious. 122
115. Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 550. The court did not address arguments of State Farm that
the provision of a reservation to one named insured is sufficient as to other insureds, thus
avoiding application of waiver and/or estoppel. State Farm relied upon the decision of the
Kentucky Court of Appeals in Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harp, 423 S.W.2d
233, 235 (Ky. 1967) (holding that non-waiver agreement obtained from named insured was
effective as to "other insured").
116. Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 550 (citing Farmers Texas County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkin-
son, 601 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pacific Indemn. Co.
v. Acel Delivery Serv., Inc., 485 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Texas law) and
numerous texts and annotations).
117. 744 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. 1988).
118. The court in McGuire, citing Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Craddock, 130 Tex. 251,
109 S.W.2d 165 (1937), stated that "the doctrine of estoppel cannot be used to create insurance
coverage when none exists by the terms of the policy." In a footnote to the opinion, the
McGuire court refused to address the validity of a so-called exception to the general rule in the
context where a defense is provided without a reservation of rights. McGuire, 744 S.W.2d at
603 n. 1. The court stated that in the case before it this exception was not outcome determina-
tive. The Williams court did not expressly address the numerous arguments in support of the
holding that McGuire logically cannot stand with the continued validity of the exception. In-
deed, the cases relied upon in McGuire indicate that the exception is solely limited to circum-
stances involving conditions of forfeiture, such as the breach of a no action clause or
cooperation clause.
119. Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 552. The court emphasized that the courts have required
proof of prejudice regardless of whether waiver or estoppel was asserted despite the fact that
the doctrine of waiver generally does not require prejudice. Id. The court held the exception
is a creature sharing elements of both waiver and estoppel. Id. at 552 n.2.
120. Id. at 553.
121. Id. (citing Automobile Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Murrah, 40 S.W.2d 233, 234-35 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1931, writ ref'd)).
122. Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 553; see also Pacific Indem. Co. v. Acel Delivery Serv., Inc.,
485 F.2d 1169, 1175 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921, 39 L. Ed. 2d 476, 94 S. Ct.
1422 (1974); Employers Casualty Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 560 (Tex. 1973).
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The Williams court held that a fact issue existed as to harm, precluding
summary judgment, because of the ambiguous underlying allegations, the
applicable law, and the resulting judgment.12 3 The court noted that these
facts also suggested the existence of a fact issue as to whether State Farm
had knowledge of the facts indicating non-coverage.1 24 The court concluded
that the insurer could make a strong argument that the provision of a de-
fense to the estate without reservation would not be prejudicial because the
responsibility of the estate was automatic under 5.61(d), requiring no proof,
no discovery and no real trial. 125 Providing a defense where there is a con-
flict of interest such as that in Williams would not appear to be even possibly
prejudicial where the liability in the underlying suit is automatic and thus
not subject to manipulation.12 6 This is not a situation where the "insurer
represents the insured... and simultaneously formulates its defense of non-
coverage against the insured."127 The court emphasized that its decision in
no way sought to discourage insurers from defending their insureds, but if
they do so when a question of coverage exists, a trial on the estoppel/waiver
exception will await.128
B. Insolvency/No Action
In Harville v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co. 129 the Fifth Circuit held that
the placing of a primary carrier in receivership does not require the excess
carrier to "drop down" and defend the insured. The excess policy in
Harville required the insurer to provide a defense if no underlying insurer
was "obligated to defend .... ,"130 The court in Harville found its opinions
in Mission National Insurance Co. v. Duke Transportation Co. 131 and Conti-
nental Marble & Granite v. Canal Insurance Co. 132 as giving "controlling
guidance" despite the fact they dealt solely with the duty of an excess carrier
to indemnify where the primary carrier was insolvent. The court noted that
the purpose of excess insurance was to provide inexpensive insurance with
high limits, and stated that this purpose would be defeated if the burden of
insolvency could be shifted to the excess carrier. 133
The court held that since the excess carrier had no duty to defend, the no-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 551 (discussing Pacific Indem. Co. v. Acel Delivery Serv., Inc., 485 F.2d 1169,
1173 (5th Cir. 1973) (Texas law), cerL denied, 415 U.S. 921, 39 L. Ed.2d 476, 94 S. Ct. 1422(1974); Employers Casualty Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 560-61 (Tex. 1973); Farmers Texas
County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
128. Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 553.
129. 885 F.2d 276, 278 (5th Cir. 1989).
130. Id.
131. 792 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1986).
132. 785 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1986).
133. Harville, 885 F.2d at 278-79.
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action clause134 still applied. 135 The court concluded that an agreed judg-
ment with no actual trial, hearing, evidence or findings was insufficient to
comply with the no-action condition in the policy.1 36
C. Hold Harmless Condition
The Fifth Circuit interpreted an unusual hold harmless endorsement in an
excess policy in Amoco Canada Petroleum Co. v. Wild Well Control, Ina 137
This endorsement required, as a condition to coverage, that the insured ob-
tain a hold harmless agreement. The insured, Wild Well, in fact was itself
obliged to indemnify a third-party, Amoco.' 38 The court rejected arguments
that excess policies always intend to follow the form of the underlying pri-
mary policy, despite absence of specific language to this effect, and that the
endorsement expressly narrowed coverage.1 39 The court also rejected argu-
ments suggesting that an exception to the workmen's compensation exclu-
sion granted contractual coverage in contravention of the endorsement. 14°
The court reasoned that the exception did not apply because it was limited to
a contractual assumption of liability for another's liability incurred under a
worker's compensation statute.' 4 '
The court concluded that the phrase "hold harmless" was not ambigu-
ous.1 42 The court rejected arguments that the endorsement's reference to
agreements "with" instead of "from" did not indicate that the agreements
had to cover some as opposed to all possible claims.143 Finally, the court
held that a bold-type reference in the endorsement that it did not amend the
terms of the policy "other than as above stated" was sufficient to expressly
limit the coverage of the umbrella policy. 144
134. Id. at 279. The no-action clause bars an action against the insurer unless 1) the in-
sured's liability has been determined after "actual trial" or 2) the claim has been determined by
a written agreement consented to by the insurer. Id.
135. Id. The court noted that this condition precedent is only waived where the contract
has been first breached by the insurer. Id. (discussing First Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Mercado, 511
S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ)).
136. Harville, 885 F.2d at 279.
137. 889 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1989).
138. Id. at 586.
139. Id.
140. Id. The exclusion stated the policy would not apply" 'to any obligation for which the
insured or any company as its insured may be held liable under any workmen's compensation,
unemployment compensation or disability benefits law, or under any similar law provided,
however, that this exclusion does not apply to liability of others assumed by the Name Insured
under contract or agreement.'" Id.
141. Id. The court's decision is bolstered by additional Texas authority holding that an
exception to an exclusion cannot amount to a grant of coverage in derogation of other policy
terms and exclusions. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Valentine, 578 S.W.2d 501, 505 ('Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1979, no writ).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 588.
144. Id.
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D. Duty to Defend
In American Alliance Insurance Co. v. Fito-Lay, Ina 145 American Alli-
ance brought a declaratory action in a New York court to obtain a ruling
that it was not liable to indemnify Frito-Lay regarding an underlying suit
based upon theories including patent infringement and unfair competition.
After the initiation of the underlying suit, Frito-Lay demanded a defense
from National Union Fire Insurance Company, its primary insurer, and
American Alliance, its excess insurer. Frito-Lay brought suit against both
carriers for their refusal to defend. After American Alliance commenced the
declaratory action in New York, Frito-Lay amended its petition in its law-
suit in Texas asserting its right to indemnity. After this amendment, Frito-
Lay obtained an order from the trial court enjoining American Alliance
from pursuing the New York declaratory action. 1"6
The court held that the duty to defend and duty to indemnify are separate
and distinct causes of action. The court reasoned that the duty to defend
requires an examination of solely the complaint allegations and the provi-
sions of the insurance policy without regard to any facts ascertained before
suit, developed in the process of the litigation, or by the ultimate outcome of
the suit. 147 The duty to indemnify is determined on the actual facts which
underlie the pleadings and result in liability rather than the pleadings them-
selves. 148 The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in
entering the injunction against American Alliance from pursuing its New
York action regarding duty to indemnify. 149 The court reached this conclu-
sion, in addition to the finding that the causes of action were found to be
separate and distinct, since Alnerican Alliance's action was brought before
the action was initiated by Frito-Lay in this suit.150
In Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. American General Fire & Casualty
Co. 151 the court affirmed a summary judgment against American General,
holding that it did not have an obligation to defend or pay a claim brought
against the insured, Masonry, for the death of one of its employees. The
City of Austin was sued for damages in addition to those paid by Westches-
ter under a worker's compensation policy. The City of Austin joined Ma-
sonry for statutory indemnity with respect to operations conducted near
high voltage lines. Thereafter, Masonry notified American General of the
city's suit for indemnity. American General declined to defend under both
the policies it had issued to Masonry. 152
145. 788 S.W.2d 152 .CTex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ dism'd).
146. Id.
147. There are some limited circumstances where extrinsic evidence may be examined. See
discussion in Cooper & Huddleston, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L. J.
329, 345 n.113 (1990).
148. Frito-Lay, 788 S.W.2d at 154.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 153-54.
151. 790 S.W.2d 816 (rex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
152. One policy was a Texas commercial multi-peril policy and the other was a general
liability-automobile policy. The first policy provided liability coverage as follows:
The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
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In a declaratory action brought by Masonry, the court held that the lan-
guage of the employment exclusion "unambiguously excludes from coverage
claims for indemnity arising out of bodily injury to Masonry employees."' ' 3
The parties did not dispute that the city's claim arose out of a covered injury
even though the claim took the form of suit for indemnity. As a result, the
court concluded that the trial court correctly held that no duty to defend
existed.15 4
The court rejected the argument that the language of the exclusion was
amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations. The court stated that the
exclusion plainly demonstrated the parties' intention to exclude any obliga-
tion on American's part to pay any liability incurred by Masonry by reason
of bodily injury sustained by an employee, regardless whether such liability
resulted directly (as in the case of a claim against Masonry by an employee
or his survivors) or indirectly (as in the case of a secondarily-liable party who
becomes entitled to indemnity by discharging an obligation for which Ma-
sonry is primarily liable). 155 The court concluded that employee injuries
were part of a class of risk American General declined to insure. 156
E. Estoppel
In Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Aries Marine
Corp. 15 7 the court recognized, like Williams, that there is an "exception" to
the rule that estoppel and/or wavier cannot be used to create coverage that
would not otherwise exist where a defense is provided without a reservation
of rights. The court also recognized that the insured must demonstrate prej-
udice.' 58 In Arkwright the court held that where an excess carrier orches-
trates settlement, without providing the legal defense, it still fits within the
defense exception.' 5 9 The court recognized an exception broader than the
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury ... to
which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence and arising out of... all
operations necessary or incident to the business of the named insured ....
The court noted exception subsection () which provided as follows:
To bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course
of his employment by the insured or to any obligation of the insured to indem-
nify another because of damages arising out such injury.
The second policy provided liability coverage as follows:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured, all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of... bodily injury... to
which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence and arising out of the...
use... of any automobile....
The court noted subsection (C), which included the following exception:
To bodily injury to an employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of
his employment by the insured or to any obligation of the insured to indemnify
another because of damages arising out of such injury ....
Id. at 818.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 736 F. Supp. 1447, 1450 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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defense situation, stating that such a broad exception should apply in all
cases where the insured party is prejudiced by reliance upon the insurer's
actions taken without reservation. 16°
The court noted that the estoppel/waiver analysis is three-pronged: 1)
whether the insurer reserved its rights; 2) whether the insurer had "suffi-
cient knowledge of the facts upon which to predicate estoppel"; and 3)
whether the insured was prejudiced. 161 The court observed that the insurer
made no attempt to inform the insured of the coverage issues or the insurer's
intent to settle the underlying claim and then seek reimbursement from the
insured. 162 The court held that mere oral notification was insufficient. 163
The court in Arkwright found the insured prejudiced as a result of it being
barred by the insurer's settlement from having a jury determine its liability
and damages. 16 The court also found that prejudice existed as a result of
the insurer's failure to disclose the conflict of interest. 165 The court's opin-
ion appears to rely on presumptive prejudice and thus it clearly conflicts
with Williams. The opinion fails to even refer to Williams.
F. Limits/Professional Liability
The policy in Tumlinson v. St. Paul Insurance Co. 166 provided an each
person limit as the maximum paid "for all claims resulting from the injury
or death of any one person." 167 The court held that the undefined term
"injury" did not include financial injury alleged to have been suffered by
parents for bodily injury to their child.168 The court held that "injury" must
be viewed in context; to give it unlimited scope, the court reasoned, would be
to negate the other policy terms referring to a limitation of all derivative
claims.169 A dissenting opinion urged that the policy was ambiguous be-
cause if the insurer had intended a single limit for bodily injury it could have
said so but did not.170
G. Employment/Workers' Compensation Exclusions
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Kasler Corp. 171 the Fifth Circuit
160. Id. at 1452.
161. Id. at 1451.
162. Id. The court recognized that it can be proper for an insurer to settle the underlying
suit subject to reservation and then seek reimbursement from the insurer. Id. (citing Employ-
ers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 621 F.2d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1980);
WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DIsPUTEs, § 5.05 (2d ed. 1988)).
163. Id. This holding does not consider the facts and circumstances of each particular
case. Id. at 1451 n.5. The doctrines of estoppel and waiver have never had a writing require-
ment. This "statute of frauds" for reservation of rights is unworkable and impractical.
164. Id. at 1452.
165. Id.
166. 786 S.W.2d 406, 407 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
167. Id. (emphasis omitted).
168. Id. at 408.
169. Id. (discussing McGovern v. Williams, 741 S.W.2d 373 (rex. 1987) (holding that loss
of consortium claim derived from husband's personal injury claim subject to single limit)).
170. Id. at 409.
171. 906 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1990).
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held that third-party claims for contribution against the insured derive from
the primary claim of an employee of the insured and are excluded under
exclusion (j), the employment exclusion.172 The court rejected the reasoning
of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Poi-
rier,173 which held that exclusion (j) excludes only workmen's compensation
claims. The court noted that exclusion (i) specifically addressed such claims,
and thus exclusion () was clearly intended to be broader. The court also
rejected arguments that employment exclusions should be read more nar-
rowly as to third-party claims for contribution. 174 The court emphasized
that the exclusion expressly referred to claims for indemnity arising out of a
work-related injury, which was sufficiently broad to include claims for
contribution. 175
H. Business Risk Exclusions
In T C. Bateson Construction Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. 176
the Houston court of appeals discussed what are commonly referred to as
the business risk exclusions contained within comprehensive general liability
policies.177 The plaintiff in Bateson had in effect a comprehensive general
172. Id. at 197. Exclusion (j) states there is no coverage for bodily injury to an employee
arising during the course of employment or "'any obligation of the insured to indemnify an-
other because of damages arising out of such injury.'" Id.
173. 120 N.H. 422, 426, 415 A.2d 882, 885-86 (1980).
174. Id. The insured urged this distinction to avoid Aberdeen Ins. Co. v. Bovee, 777
S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1989, no writ), and Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Cen-Texas
Vending Co., 530 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), both of
which involved direct claims by employees against the insured/employer. There was no men-
tion by the court that this distinction lacks merit in light of the fact that a "third-party" claim
for indemnity is derivative of the primary claim.
175. Id. The court glided over the issue of whether a claim for contribution falls within the
indemnity language in the exclusion. These are dissimilar legal concepts. Applying the rule
that exclusionary language is to be even more strictly construed than other policy terms, a
strong argument could be made, but apparently was not, that the exclusion applies only to
indemnity, not contribution.
176. 784 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
177. In this case, the pertinent portions of the policy were as follows:
The company will pay on the behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of:
A. Bodily Injury or; B. Property Damage
To which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company
shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking
damages on the account of such bodily injury or property damage ....
The pertinent exclusions within the policy were as follows:
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY:
(a) To liability assumed by the insured under any contract" or agreement ex-
cept incidental contract; but this exclusion does not apply to a warranty of fit-
ness or quality of named insured products or a warranty that work performed
by or on behalf of the named insured will be done in a workmen like manner
(1) To property damage to the named insured products arising out of such
products or any part of such products;
(m) To property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named
insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts
or equipment furnished in connection therewith.
Id. at 694.
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liability policy issued by Lumbermens for the years of 1969, 1970 and 1971.
Bateson had entered into a contract with the University of Texas in Septem-
ber 1967 to construct the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The construction
began in 1967 and was completed in November 1971. Prior to that time and
thereafter, cracks appeared in the marble walls of the building. The Univer-
sity requested that Bateson repair these cracks. Bateson refused to make the
repairs, and the University had to hire another contractor. The University
subsequently filed suit against Bateson for indemnification of the costs of the
repair job. Thereafter, Bateson made demand upon Lumbermens to defend
this suit. Lumbermens denied Bateson's requested defense, asserting that
the injury was not covered by its policy with Bateson.
The contract between Bateson and the University contained specific provi-
sions regarding the specific type of marble which was to sheathe the library's
exterior. The contract further prescribed a particular formula for the mortar
to be used in anchoring the marble. Additionally, the contract specifically
described how the marble was to be anchored. The only property damage
alleged by the University was the cost to correct the marble with sheathing,
install anchoring components and some related water damage. Investigation
revealed that mortar which did not conform to the contract specifications
caused at least in part, damage to the sheathing. This investigation revealed
that the presence of gypsum in the mortar caused expansion, resulting in
cracking of the marble. All of the materials, including the marble, anchor-
ing components and mortar used to affix the marble sheathing to the struc-
ture, were provided by Bateson or its subcontractors, except, the masonry
subcontractor, Don Rem, who was an independent contractor.
The underlying suit resulted in a settlement by Bateson for $1,550,000
plus costs. Bateson then proceeded to file suit against Lumbermens for in-
demnification under its insurance policy with them. The trial court rejected
the argument of Bateson that the exclusions were ambiguous as a matter of
law and should be strictly construed against the insurer. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's rendering of summary judgment, holding that
the policy was not ambiguous and did not provide coverage for repair and
replacement cost. The court noted that the purpose of comprehensive liabil-
ity insurance is to protect the insured against claims for personal injury or
property damage caused by the completed product. It is not meant to pro-
vide for the repair and replacement of the product.178
The court rejected arguments by Bateson that "on behalf of the named
insured" did not include independent contractors and thus would not ex-
clude coverage.1 79 Instead, the court held that independent contractors
178. Bateson, 784 S.W.2d at 695 (citing La-marche v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d
325, 326 (Fla. 1980)). The court further held:
In the context of this case the exclusions are designed to protect insurers from
contractors' attempts to recover funds to correct deficiencies caused by contrac-
tors' questionable performance. Their use demonstrates the insureds' belief that
the cost of not performing well is the cost of doing business and not considered
part of the risk sharing scheme for which general liability policies are written.
179. Id.
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must be considered within the language of the policy exclusion or the situa-
tion would result in coverage under the policy for the operations completed
by independent contractors, but not the insured or its employees.180 The
court specifically noted that the independent contractor was not an in-
dependent contractor hired by the University of Texas but rather was hired
by Bateson, the insured.' 81
The court further rejected Bateson's argument that the term work in ex-
clusion (m) was ambiguous and should be interpreted to mean labor rather
than product.82 The court held that if Bateson's interpretation was fol-
lowed, there could be no property damage to the labor itself, but the only
property damage would be to the product resulting therefrom.' 8 3 The court
noted that Bateson cited no authority for this argument. Moreover, the
court rejected Bateson's argument that exclusion (m) was ambiguous regard-
ing whether denial of coverage "to property damage to work" applied to
portions of work of the insured other than that out of which property dam-
age arose. The court held that upon specific review of Texas cases dealing
with exclusion (m), the exclusion is not ambiguous and "it clearly denies
coverage for damage to work of the insured that is not defective."' 8 4
The court also rejected Bateson's argument that the policy is ambiguous
regarding coverage for breaches of warranty and failure to perform work in
a workmanlike manner, specifically with regard to the general insuring
clause, the limits of liability provisions and exclusion (a). Bateson urged that
the policy language would lead a reasonable insured to naturally assume that
coverage would exist for all damages caused by the operations of independ-
ent contractors. The court held that the language of the insuring clause re-
quires that the insurance apply to the coverage being sought and that the
premium paid does not buy coverage for all property damage, only for the
types of damage provided for in the policy.' 85 The court stated that each
exclusion is to be read independently of every other exclusion.' 8 6 The court
concluded that exclusion (a) was not ambiguous. Additionally, the court
180. Id. (citations omitted).
181. Id. at 696.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. The cases discussed by the court in concluding that exclusion (in) is not ambigu-
ous included the following: Mid-United Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Lloyds Ins. Co., 754
S.W.2d 824 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1988, writ denied); Dorchester Development Corp. v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 380 (rex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ); McCord, Condron &
McDonald, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 607 SW.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Volentine, 578 S.W.2d 501 (rex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1979, no writ); Eulich v. Home Indem. Co., 503 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Hennessee Homes, Inc., 465 S.W.2d
955 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Employers Casualty Co. v.
Brown-McKee, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
185. Bateson, 784 S.W.2d at 696 (citation omitted).
186. Id. (citation omitted). The court noted that the exception to exclusion (a) "merely
removes breach of implied warranty of fitness, quality or workmanship from the specific exclu-
sion relating to contractual liability. The exception remains subject to and limited by all other
related exclusions contained in the policy." Id.
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rejected Bateson's argument that the independent contractors' coverage pro-
visions were ambiguous.187
L Effect of Tender of Defense
In United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Olympia Wings, Inc. 18 8 the
insurer tendered a defense subject to a reservation of rights letter rejected by
the insured. The insurer then filed a declaratory action to determine the
coverage issue. The insured promptly entered a $20 million consent judg-
ment in favor of the underlying tort claimant who agreed with the insured
only to execute judgment against the insurance policies. 189 The judgment
recited that the settlement between the insured and the claimant was " 'in all
things reasonable'" and that "'no fraud or collusion has occurred in the
settlement of the case . . ' "190
The Fifth Circuit held that the consent judgment against the insured was
not enforceable against the insurer.191 The court summarized the effect of
the rejection of a tender of defense subject to reservation as follows: 1) the
tender with reservation does not breach the duty to defend; 2) the insurer
has a duty to pay only to the extent that the damages involved covered con-
duct and/or injury; 3) the insurer can challenge the reasonableness of the
damage award; and 4) the insured can defend itself unrestricted by policy
conditions. 192
The court interpreted the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Employers
Casualty Co. v. Block 19 3 to prohibit an insurer from contesting the reasona-
bleness of a consent judgment entered on a settlement between its insured
and an injured party when the insurer refused to defend. The court stated
that Block did not extend this rule to an insurer who tenders a defense, re-
serving the right to later deny coverage.194 The court reasoned that an in-
surer refusing to defend is in "privity with the insured on all essential issues
in the underlying action" and thus cannot attack reasonableness, but an in-
surer which tenders a defense with reservation is not in privity and can ac-
cordingly attack reasonableness.195 Thus, where defense is tendered with
187. Id.
188. 896 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990).
189. Id. at 951.
190. Id. at 952.
191. Id. at 953.
192. Id. at 953-54. As to "reasonableness," the court noted that it must be determined that
"the amount is excessive under the prudent uninsured standard," in order to allow a remittitur
to reduce the damages to a proper amount. Id. at 954 (quoting Rhodes v. Chicago Ins. Co.,
719 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1983)). The court's assertion that the insured is freed from the policy
conditions when it rejects a defense subject to reservation is erroneous. If the duty to defend is
not breached, then there is no excuse for the insured sufficient to permit non-compliance with
its own contractual obligation.
193. 744 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1988).
194. Olympia, 896 F.2d at 954 (discussing Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (insurer who tenders defense subject to reservation
precluded from contesting reasonableness of consent judgment)).
195. Id. at 955. This rule is devoid of logic. An insurer denying coverage and an insurer
reserving coverage defenses are both in conflict with the insured and could not possibly be in
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reservation, the insurer has no need to collaterally attack the judgment be-
cause it could not bind it under res judicata or collateral estoppel. 196
Finally, the court held that the exclusion of evidence of the underlying
settlement to show conspiracy to establish coverage was within the trial
court's broad discretion. 197 The court reasoned that evidence that a settle-
ment was entered six months after the alleged conspiracy was too shallow to
meet the threshold of relevance necessary in such an action.198
J. Cooperation
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 199
the insured disappeared after the insurer entered a defense on his behalf.
The insured's pleadings were eventually stricken for failure to answer dis-
covery requests and a default judgment on behalf of the plaintiff was entered.
The claimant then filed a garnishment action against the insurer. The in-
surer urged that it had no duty to pay because the cooperation clause of the
policy had been violated by the insured's disappearance. 2°0 The claimant
argued that the failure to cooperate could not have harmed the insurer be-
cause its insured was strictly and automatically liable for damaging an un-
derground telephone conduit. The court correctly rejected this argument,
noting that strict liability applied only where the utility company had no
notice of the danger to its lines. 20' Finally, the court held that it did not
matter what standard - material or substantial or prejudice - applied in
determining if the breach by the insured of the cooperation clause was ac-
tionable.20 2 The court reasoned that either the striking of pleadings or the
entry of a default judgment was sufficient to raise a fact issue precluding
summary judgment on behalf of the insured.20 3
K Professional Services/Policy Limits
In Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. North River Insurance Co. 204 the
court held that a malpractice and professional services exclusion barring
coverage for bodily injury occuring " 'due to... the rendering of or failure
to render ... any service or treatment conducive to health or of a profes-
sional nature,' " did not bar coverage under a general liability policy for a
hospital/insured's failure to monitor patients, repair windows, and maintain
an adequate staff with respect to a psychiatric unit.205 The court interpreted
privity. It is only in the peculiar public policy vortex of insurance law that parties in conflict
are treated as having such similar interests that they are said to be in privity.
196. Id. at 955 n.2.
197. Id. at 957.
198. Id.
199. 790 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
200. Id. at 814.
201. Id. The court indicated that Bell had given inaccurate information as to the location
of the lines and thus strict liability was inapplicable. IA
202. Id.
203. Id. at 816.
204. 909 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1990).
205. Id. at 135.
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the exclusion "to avoid coverage only for actions taken on behalf of a patient
that were based on professional, medical judgment."2°6 The court noted
that the failure to maintain a window so as to prevent the claimant's spouse
from committing suicide did not involve the exercise of professional judg-
ment where the decision to provide the protection had been made, but the
plan to provide the protection was inadequately effectuated. 207 The court
specifically noted that the failure to adequately maintain the window in-
volved a determination of whether the screws in the window sashes would be
sufficient. The court characterized this as an administrative, rather than a
medical, decision.208 The court looked to cases from other jurisdictions in
which the use of equipment was involved in the accident. The court noted
that in each case the courts found that the exclusion did not preclude cover-
age where the services in question did not require professional training as a
prerequisite to performance. 20 9
206. Id.
207. Id. at 136.
208. Id.
209. Id. (discussing Duke University v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 96 N.C. App. 635,
386 S.E.2d 762 (1990) (holding that injury to patient as she attempted to get out of specially
designed dialysis chair where the casters of the chair had not been properly locked did not
involve "professional services"), review denied, 326 N.C. 595, 393 S.E.2d 876 (1990); D'antoni
v. Sarah Mayo Hospital, 144 So.2d 643 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (holding that failure to raise
side rail on hospital bed did not fall within the professional services exclusion)). The court
recognized that some courts have in fact broadly construed the exclusion to destroy coverage.
Id. (discussing Antles v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 221 Cal. App. 2d 438, 34 Cal. Rptr. 508
(1963) (holding that exclusion barred coverage for suit involving accident in which a negli-
gently-mounted heat lamp fell on patient)). The court appears to have gone to great lengths to
effectuate the distinct purposes of professional liability and general liability policies. The
courts have recognized that these two types of policies were "intended to insure different risks,
even if there is a small area in which the policies overlap." Ratliff v. Employers Liab. Assur-
ance Corp., 515 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Ky. 1974). There are at least two types of policies necessary
for a professional: "professional liability insurance against liability stemming from rendering
or failing to render any professional services, and a general liability policy against negligent
acts stemming from premises and operations hazards." FC & S Bulletin (Casualty & Surety
Section), Public Liability Dma-1 (May 1981).
The court's discussion of the case authority in other jurisdictions is somewhat misleading.
The vast majority of cases involving coverage questions where the underlying claim is one for
negligent handling of equipment have held that such liability involves the rendition of "profes-
sional services." Annotation, Coverage and Exclusions of Liability or Indemnity Policy on
Physicans, Surgeons and Other Healers, 33 A.L.R. 4th 4, § 10 (1984). One of the leading cases
in this area is American Policy Holder's Ins. Co. v. Michota, 156 Ohio St. 578, 103 N.E.2d 817
(1952), in which the underlying claim involved the operation and maintenance of a hydraulic
chair used by the physician in his work. The court held that "maintenance of the treatment
chair in a proper and safe condition for the accommodation of patients was a service or duty
directly connected with the practice by (the defendant] of his profession.. . ." Id. at 819; see
also Harris v. Firemen's Fund, 257 P.2d 221, 225 (Wash. 1953) (holding that injuries suffered
by patient when on examination table fell within exclusion; emphasizing exclusion was broader
than simply malpractice; adding that the equipment had been specially designed for rendition
for professional services and was part of equipment of profession).
Nevertheless, the Guaranty court's opinion is indicative of a growing trend carefully analyz-
ing the precise nature of the equipment and its use. Some courts have recognized that where
the use of the equipment in question involves a purely mechanical act, the exclusion is not
involved. See, eg., Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148, 151 (1969) (holding
that sponge counting did not involve rendition or professional services because it was a mere
mechanical manual act); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gold Cross Ambulance Serv. Co., 327 F. Supp. 149,
154-55 (W.D. Okla. 1971) (holding that ambulance services' refusal to transport patient in-
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Importantly, the court in Guaranty suggested that while the maintenance
of the window involved a business/administrative action, the failure to prop-
erly observe the patient did in fact involve professional services.210 The
court found that the failure to maintain and the failure to observe were in
fact independent causes.211 The court noted that under Texas law, the in-
surer is liable where the loss is caused "by a covered peril and an excluded
peril that are independent causes of the loss .... ,212
volved "manual labor" and thus did not amount to "professional services"); D'antoni, 144 So.
2d at 646. Other courts have held that all activity at a health care facility, such as a convales-
cent home, are not necessarily professional. New Amesterdam Casualty Co. v. Knowles, 95
So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1957) (holding that injury as result of falling from bed in nursing home
did not involve "professional services"). Other courts have held that where the use of equip-
ment or the premises involves a mere "manual act" and not the use of intellectual or special-
ized knowledge, then the exclusion is inapplicable. Keepes v. Doctors Convalescent Center,
Inc., 89 I1. App. 2d 36, 231 N.E.2d 274, 276 (App. Ct. 1967) (holding that burn to child on
indoor radiator when child was left alone by bathing attendant did not involve "professional
services"; merely involved hazard of normal living). In contrast, courts have held that where
the equipment is an integral part of the rendition of treatment, "professional services" are in
fact involved. For example, in Andes the court held that the adjustment of a heating lamp in
the rendition of chiropractic services was an integral part of the services provided. The court
noted that the manner of adjustment of the lamp, the determination of the duration of expo-
sure, and other factors requires special skill and training; thus, the use of the equipment was
imbued with trained mental processes and the exclusion was found to be applicable. Interest-
ingly, the Fifth Circuit did not mention its decision in Demondre v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 264
F.2d 70, 71 (5th Cir. 1959), in which the court found that plaintiff's negligence action against
an insured for failing to place sideboards in hospital beds, resulting in a sedated claimant
falling out of the bed, did not involve "professional services" as a matter of law. The court
listed the following factors to be considered in determining whether a particular claim involves
"professional services": 1) whether the act in question was by a professional; 2) examining the
principal function of the apparatus in question; and 3) whether the omission to act involved
action requested by the patient or whether such action was prescribed by a professional.
Only one Texas court has ever in fact interpreted the meaning of the term "professional
services" in the context of an insurance policy. The Fifth Circuit also failed to mention this
case. In that case, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Crazy Water Co., 160 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1942, no writ), the claimant was a guest of a hotel that provided bathing
services. Some of the persons taking baths at the hotel did so under a doctor's prescription.
The work of the attendants, called "tubbers," required some training and skill, "including the
ability to follow directions in a doctor's prescription in giving a bath." Their duties included
the preparation of the bath, running of the water, testing the temperature and providing assist-
ance to the bather in getting in and out of the tub. The court made clear that "professional
services" refers to services pertaining "to some profession rendered by one in the pursuit of
such profession." Id. at 103-04. The court added that this term does not include menial serv-
ices or the services of a common laborer. The court emphasized that special consideration
must be given to the specific nature of the insureds task or business. The court held that the
insured involved in the case before it was a hotel operator and that the bath house was merely
incidental to this particular vocation; thus, the court added that operating a business is not the
same thing as operating a profession. The court in Maryland Casualty reasoned that a "profes-
sion" involves "labor, skill, education, [and] special knowledge .... Id. at 104-05. The court
emphasized that the labor, "as well as the skill, however, involved is predominantly mental or
intellectual, rather than physical or manual." Id. at 105. The court added that it is of the
essence of the term "profession" that the profit should be dependent mainly upon the personal
qualifications of the person by whom it is carried on. Id. Accordingly, the court held that the
"tubber" involved in the case before it was not involved in the rendition of "professional serv-
ices" within the meaning of the exclusionary language in the policy in question.
210. North River, 909 F.2d at 137.
211. Id. "[Tihe jury found that each of the hospital's acts of negligence separately was in
proximate cause" of the death. Id.
212. Id.
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The second issue presented in Guaranty involved a different policy, the
professional liability policy issued by U.S. Fire. The question addressed by
the court was whether each claim is based upon the number of injuries or the
number of acts of negligence. 213 The insured argued that each of the multi-
ple plaintiffs' claims constituted a claim for purposes of the limit of liability
section of the policy. 214 The court rejected the insured's arguments. 215 The
court also rejected arguments that multiple grounds of liability create multi-
ple claims, thus invoking the aggregate limit of the policy.216 The court held
that this novel theory was neither supported nor had it been adopted by the
decisions of the Texas courts.217
Judge Gee issued a dissenting opinion urging that the majority's holding
with respect to professional services was incorrect. Judge Gee reasoned that
"only a medical professional is equipped to assess the degree and character
of restraint needful for the safety of a given psychotic patient and that, there-
fore, such a decision involves a professional judgment - the recognition and
weighing of medical, not administrative, risk."218 The dissent urged the de-
cision of the Fifth Circuit in Big Town Nursing Homes, Ina v. Reserve Insur-
ance Co. 219 supported this conclusion. 220
III. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
A. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists
1. Stacking Coverages/Exclusionary Provisions
Harwell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 221 presented two
issues: first, whether a plaintiff's underinsured motorists coverage is offset
by a payment from an underinsured motorist; and, second, whether an ex-
clusionary provision in one policy prevents stacking of the PIP coverage of
the two policies when a plaintiff owns two vehicles that are insured under
separate policies. Harwell sustained injuries when his motorcycle collided
with an automobile. Harwell suffered $40,000 in bodily injuries and $5,000
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing Chicago Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indemn. Co., 502 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1980);
Pinheiro v. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Assoc., 406 Mass. 288, 547 N.E.2d 49
(1989)).
215. The court interpreted Texas case law to "have held that claims by multiple plaintiffs
are subject to the single claim limit when each of the plaintiffs' claims arise out of the same
single injury or death." Id. at 138 (citing McGovern v. Williams, 741 S.W,2d 373 (Tex. 1987);
Madisonville I.S.D. v. Kyle, 658 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1983); and City of Austin v. Cooksey, 570
S.W.2d 386 (Tex. 1978)).
216. Id. at 138 (distinguishing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar.
Co., 2 Haw. App. 595, 637 P.2d 1146 (1981)).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 492 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1974).
220. The court held in that case that unlawful restraint of a patient involved professional
services because the restraint involved the exercise of" 'a trained nursing judgment in obedi-
ence to an established medical policy' and not 'a purely physical action in response to a busi-
ness determination.'" North River, 909 F.2d at 139 (quoting Big Town, 492 F.2d at 525).
221. 782 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ). The court withdrew
its earlier opinion issued July 27, 1989 and substituted the current opinion.
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in medical expenses. Harwell settled with the underinsured motorist's in-
surer for $25,000, the full amount of that policy. State Farm, Harwell's in-
surer, paid him $2,500 in personal injury protection under his motorcycle
policy. Harwell thereafter sued State Farm to recover under his own motor-
cycle and automobile policies. The case was tried to the bench on stipulated
facts.
The trial court found that Harwell's motorcycle policy covered the acci-
dent, but refused to stack the motorcycle policy with the other motorist's
policy. The court found that since Harwell received payment under the mo-
torist's policy, he was not entitled to any additional recovery under the sec-
ond policy. 222 Accordingly, the court offset the $20,000 underinsured
motorists coverage in the motorcycle policy by the $25,000 payment made
by the other motorist. The trial court also found that Harwell's automobile
policy failed to provide personal injury protection (PIP) because of Har-
well's owned vehicle exclusion.223
Both of Harwell's policies had $20,000 per individual underinsured mo-
torists coverage with a maximum of $40,000 per accident. Each policy pro-
vided $2,500 in PIP. Following Stracener v. United Services Automobile
Association,224 the appellate court held that Harwell could recover under the
underinsured provision of his motorcycle policy.2 25 Since Harwell's dam-
ages were stipulated to be $40,000 and the underinsured's policy paid Har-
well $25,000, $15,000 damages remained. Under the underinsured provision
Harwell was entitled to recover the remaining $15,000 of his motorcycle
policy, which provided $20,000 in coverage.226
The court prohibited Harwell from recovering under the PIP provision of
his automobile policy as well because Harwell's automobile policy contained
an exclusionary clause stating that the policy would not provide PIP cover-
age for any person for bodily injury sustained while occupying a motor vehi-
cle not covered in the policy declarations.227 Following the opinion in
Holyfield v. Members Mutual Insurance Co.,228 the court found the exclu-
sion to be valid and held that Harwell was not entitled to stack the PIP
benefits of his two policies. The court specifically rejected Harwell's argu-
ment that Stracener instructed the court to stack the PIP benefits of Har-
well's two policies. The court noted that the Stracener court held that a
party's recovery under the uninsured provision of his policy cannot be offset
222. Id. at 519.
223. Id. The exclusionary clauses under the PIP clause stated:
We do not provide Personal Injury Protection Coverage for any person for bod-
ily injury sustained:
4. While occupying ... any motor vehicle (other than your covered auto)
which is owned by you.
['Your covered auto' is defined as 'any vehicle shown in the declarations.']
224. 777 S.W.2d. 378, 382-84 (Tex. 1989).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 520.
227. Id. at 519.
228. 566 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978), writ refd n.r.e, per curiam, 572 S.W.2d
672 (Tex. 1978).
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by the recovery from the underinsured.229 In Stracener, no exclusionary
clause precluded recovery. Here, the court found Stracener not to be con-
trolling under the facts of this case since such a clause existed and found that
the exclusionary provision in the automobile policy validly precluded recov-
ery of $2,500 PIP from the automobile policy. 230
In Moore v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 23 1 the court addressed
the question of whether coverage for uninsured or underinsured motorists
benefits may be validly excluded for accidents resulting in injuries to an in-
sured while occupying a vehicle other than one covered by the policy in
question. Moore sustained his injuries when his vehicle was struck by a
trailer that became unhitched from a passing automobile. Moore carried
insurance under a policy on his own vehicle and also had coverage under an
automobile policy issued to his father and sister with whom he resided.232
Moore claimed entitlement under the underinsured and personal injury pro-
tection benefits of his family's policy in addition to the recovery gained
through his own policy even though the family's policy expressly excluded
coverage for injuries sustained while in a vehicle owned by any family mem-
ber not identified in the policy declarations as a covered auto.233 Moore
urged that, under the decision in Stephens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.,234 the exclusions were invalid because they deprived him of
the coverage required under article 5.06-1 of the Texas Insurance Code.235
The court of appeals rejected this contention, noting that the requirements of
article 5.06-1 did not apply to his family's policy as that policy failed to
afford him coverage while he was operating his own vehicle insured under
another policy. 236
2. Exclusion for Vehicle Furnished for Regular Use
Briones v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 237 involved a one
vehicle accident wherein the passenger, Briones, sustained injuries while
neither the truck nor the driver were insured.233 The injured party's unin-
sured motorist clause stated that an uninsured motor vehicle does not in-
clude any vehicle "owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of
229. Harwell, 782 S.W.2d at 520 (citing Stracener v. United Serv. Auto. Assoc. v. Hes-
tilow, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382-84 (rex. 1989).
230. Id.
231. 792 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, no writ).
232. Id. at 820-21.
233. Id. at 821.
234. 508 F.2d 1363, 1367 (5th Cir. 1975).
235. Moore, 792 S.W.2d at 821.
236. Id. On its face, the opinion appears to involve the broadest form of circular reasoning.
Closer examination, however, reveals that the court probably intended to draw a distinction
between limitations on coverage for persons insured and the scope of the persons insured under
the policy. In other words, it is permissible for an automobile insurer to limit who is insured
under the policy even though it is impermissible to limit uninsured-underinsured motorists
coverage for those who fall within the class of persons insured.
237. 790 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
238. Id. at 71.
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the insured or any family member. ' 239 In the trial court, the parties stipu-
lated that the only question to be litigated was whether the vehicle in which
Briones rode was furnished or available for the regular use of Briones. The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurer.
The evidence showed that Briones was an employee of Cervantes Truck-
ing Company, the owner of the truck in question. His principal duty was to
drive trucks assigned him. Briones customarily used any one of the five ve-
hicles owned by Cervantes, as assigned to him by Cervantes. He had driven
the truck in question regularly for a period of four years. In reviewing the
facts of this case, as well as other Texas cases with similar facts,240 the court
stated that Briones occupied a vehicle regularly furnished for his use. It
concluded, however, that the case was governed by Stracener241 and, citing
Stracener at length, focused particularly on the language where the Texas
Supreme Court outlined expectations of the insured when purchasing unin-
sured motorist coverage as well as the purpose of the uninsured motorist
statute.242 The court noted that it is doubtful that when Briones purchased
the uninsured provision he believed he would not be protected if involved in
an accident while a passenger in an uninsured motor vehicle owned by his
employer, and driven by an uninsured co-employee. 243
The San Antonio court of appeals also followed a Fifth Circuit opinion
that outlined the standard of review used in determining the validity of an
exclusionary provision in an uninsured motorists policy.24 4 That opinion
stated that the key is whether the invocation of the exclusion would, under
the circumstances of the particular case under consideration, operate to de-
prive an insured of the protection required by the Texas uninsured motorist
statute. 245 The court held that exclusionary clauses are invalid restrictions
on coverage when they excuse the policy for which a premium has been paid
from providing the minimum coverage required by the Texas uninsured mo-
torist statute.246
The court further held that although earlier Texas courts of appeals have
upheld the exclusion of coverage when persons are injured in vehicles regu-
larly furnished an insured by third parties from the uninsured motorists cov-
239. Id.
240. Id. at 72 (citing Hall v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 670 S.W.2d 775
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ); International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Walther, 463 S.W.2d
774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, no writ)).
241. Id. (citing Stracener v. United Serv. Auto. Assoc., 777 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1989)).
242. Briones, 790 S.W.2d at 73. This merely compounds the erroneous terminology used in
Stracener. The rules of construction in Texas focus on the intent of the parties as reflected in
the plain meaning of the four corners of the contract, not on the reasonable expectations of the
insured.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 73-74 (citing Stephens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 1363 (5th
Cir. 1975)).
245. Briones, 790 S.W.2d at 74.
246. Stephens, 508 F.2d at 1367-68 (citing Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d
679, 685 (Tex. 1974)); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon Supp. 1974).
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erage, Stracener places serious doubts on the validity of such agreements.247
The court stated its unwillingness to condemn the exclusion of vehicles regu-
larly furnished for the use of the insured in all cases but believed the better
posture was to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the invocation of
the exclusion would, under the circumstances of the particular case, operate
to deprive an insured of the protection required by the Texas uninsured mo-
torists statute.2'8 Accordingly, the court concluded that under the facts of
Stracener, to deny the insured recovery under the uninsured motorists clause
of his policy would frustrate the intent of the legislature to provide protec-
tion for conscientious motorists from financial loss caused by negligent fi-
nancially irresponsible motorists as is mandated by the inclusion of
uninsured and underinsured motorists coverage in the Texas Insurance
Code.2
49
3. Default of Uninsured Motorist/Punitive Damages
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Lichte250 an uninsured driver,
Hayes, struck Mrs. Lichte, the insured motorist. She, joined by her hus-
band, sued their insurance carrier, Government Employees Insurance Com-
pany (GEICO). Lichte then joined the uninsured driver in the lawsuit. The
uninsured driver failed to answer, and Lichte took a default judgment in the
amount of $100,000 for actual damages and $400,000 for punitive damages.
Lichte obtained a severance of that judgment and then moved for summary
judgment against GEICO, which the court granted, for the sum of $300,000.
This amount represented the limit recoverable under the uninsured motorist
provisions of the policy. The trial court also rendered judgment for GEICO
on its counterclaim seeking declaratory relief, asserting that under the insur-
ance policy provisions GEICO was not liable for punitive damages and/or
Lichte's husband's claim for loss of consortium.
GEICO complained that the trial court should not have granted summary
judgment since a default judgment was granted to Lichte against the unin-
sured motorist. The appellate court noted that GEICO could not have rep-
resented the uninsured motorist's interest at the default hearing because of a
potential conflict of interest. The court noted that nothing in GEICO's pol-
icy or Texas law gave GEICO the right to either defend the uninsured mo-
torist or object to the severance of Mrs. Lichte's claims against him.
Conversely, Mrs. Lichte had every right to obtain a default judgment against
the uninsured motorist and to insure that judgment became final as to him.
Had GEICO taken any action preventing Mrs. Lichte from seeking and ob-
taining what she could from Hayes, GEICO would have arguably breached
its duty to her.251
Next, GEICO argued that the trial court erred in rendering summary
247. Briones, 790 S.W.2d at 74 (citing Hall v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co.,
670 S.W.2d at 775; International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Walther, 463 S.W.2d at 774)).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 792 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1990, no writ).
251. Id.
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judgm6nt for Lichte on her assertion that GEICO failed to plead the policy
provision requiring its written consent to be bound by the prior default judg-
ment arising out of Lichte's suit against the uninsured motorist. GEICO's
policy provision pertaining to uninsured motorist coverage stated that any
judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought without the insurer's
written consent did not bind the insurer. 252 The court found that Texas
Rule Civil Procedure 94 did not apply because the insurer's pleading burden
failed to extend to matters affecting the insurer's general obligation to their
insured, on which the claimant has the burden of proof.25 3 Rule 94 does not
require an insurance company to affirmatively plead a provision in the policy
that defines coverage. 254
The provision in the Lichte's policy with GEICO that required Lichte to
obtain GEICO's written consent in order for any judgment against an unin-
sured motorist to bind the insurer was a matter affecting GEICO's general
obligation under the terms of the policy. 255 The court held it did not con-
cern a particular cause or risk which comes within a particular exception to
the general liability under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94.256 Since Lichte
failed to obtain GEICO's written consent as required, Lichte's judgment
may have been a final binding judgment against the uninsured motorist, but
it was not binding on GEICO.257 Accordingly, the appellate court held that
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against GEICO.
Finally, GEICO asserted that the trial court erred in rendering summary
judgment awarding Lichte punitive damages because punitive damages are
not recoverable under the uninsured motorist coverage provision in the in-
surance policy. 258 The policy declaration sheet provided a $300,000 limit for
uninsured motorist coverage for bodily injury per person.
Citing Stracener, the El Paso court of appeals held that article 5.06-1(1) of
252. Although GEICO did not raise lack of written consent in its pleadings, the appellate
court found that the provision requiring GEICO's written consent was not a condition prece-
dent to bringing suit. Id. at 548.
253. Id.
254. TEx. R. Civ. P. 94.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. The court cited with approval Criterion Ins. Co. v. Brown, 469 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.), wherein the policy provision providing for consent was
analogous to the one in the Lichte case. That court stated that an insured seeking the benefits
of his uninsured motorist insurance coverage had several choices:
1) Sue his insurance company directly without suing the uninsured motorist;
or
2) Obtain the written consent from his insurance carrier and then sue the unin-
sured motorist alone, the judgment obtained then would be binding on the
insurance carrier or
3) Without the consent of his insurance carrier go ahead and proceed against
the uninsured motorist. However, any judgment obtained against the unin-
sured motorist will not be binding on the insurance carrier. Liability and
damages will have to be relitigated.
258. Lichte, 792 S.W.2d at 548, 549. The uninsured/underinsured coverage provision of
the policy stated that the company "will pay damages which a covered person is legally enti-
tled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily
injury sustained by a covered person, or property damage, caused by the accident."
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the Texas Insurance Code should be liberally construed to give full effect to
the public policy concerns that led to its enactment, such as providing pro-
tection to insured motorists from uninsured motorists who are negligent and
financially irresponsible.25 9 The court held that the uninsured/underinsured
coverage provision allowing the insured to collect from the insurer those
damages the insured would otherwise be entitled to recover from the unin-
sured motorist does not include coverage for an award of exemplary dam-
ages. 26° The court reasoned that the purpose of allowing the recovery of
punitive damages was to punish the wrongdoer who, in the instant case, was
the uninsured motorist and not the insurer.261
4. Personal Injury Protection
In James v. Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co. 262 James was
injured while a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Tarter when an unin-
sured motorist struck Tarter's car. The parties stipulated that the uninsured
motorist committed acts and omissions that negligently proximately caused
the damages sustained by James. Nationwide Property covered Tarter and
passenger James. James made a claim against the policy's personal injury
protection (P.I.P.) provision for reimbursement of medical expenses totalling
$840. Nationwide reimbursed James for these claims. Thereafter, James
made a claim for $4,000 against the policy's uninsured motorists provision.
Nationwide refused to pay the $4,000, stating that it was entitled to an offset
for the $840 previously paid to James under the P.I.P. provision of the auto-
mobile policy. The trial court entered summary judgment awarding Nation-
wide an offset of the sum of $840 leaving Nationwide obligated to pay James
$3,160.263
In affirming the trial court's summary judgment, the appellate court cited
both article 5.06-3 of the Texas Insurance Code 64 and the language of the
policy. Article 5.06-3 makes personal injury protection coverage mandatory
in Texas personal automobile policies. Article 5.06-3(h) 2 65 allows the insur-
ance carrier an offset on any other liability claims payable to a guest or pas-
senger riding in the insured's vehicle.266 The court held that this Insurance
259. Id. (citing Stracener v. United Serv. Auto. Assoc., 777 S.W.2d at 382; Members Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Hermann Hospital, 664 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Tex. 1984)).
260. Id.
261. Id. The court's decision attempted to distinguish prior Texas cases allowing coverage
for punitive damages. See, e.g., Ridgway v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied en banc, 583 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978); Big Town Nursing Home, Inc. v. Reserve
Ins. Co., 492 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1974); American Home Assurance Co. v. Safway Steel Prod-
ucts Co., 743 S.W.2d 693, 701-702 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dairyland
County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court's distinction does nothing to rebut Home Indemnity Co. v. Tyler,
522 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which held
coverage for punitive damages was available under uninsured motorist coverage.
262. 786 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
263. Id.
264. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon 1981).
265. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3(h) (Vernon 1981).
266. Id.
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Code provision allows the insurance carrier to offset any payments made for
personal injury against liability insurance claims, including claims for unin-
sured motorist liability.2 67 The section of the insurance policy at issue in
James stated that in order to avoid insurance benefit payments in excess of
actual damages sustained, the insurer would pay all covered damages not
paid or payable under personal injury protection coverage. Furthermore,
the policy stated that any payment under the coverage provided by the pol-
icy to or for a covered person would reduce any amount that person was
entitled to recover for the same incident under the liability coverage 6f the
policy. Accordingly, the court held that the contract and statute entitled the
insurer to take an offset for personal injury protection payments made to
James and against amounts claimed by Nationwide for uninsured motorists
coverage.2 68
5. Government Vehicles As "Uninsured"
In United Services Automobile Association v. Blakemore269 United Services
Automobile Association (USAA) denied an uninsured motorist claim arising
out of an accident with a government vehicle. Blakemore sued USAA seek-
ing contractual and tort damages arising from USAA's denial of benefits
under uninsured motorists insurance coverage of a policy issued Blakemore
by USAA. The trial court granted Blakemore's motion for interlocutory
summary judgment on the policy coverage issue, holding USAA liable to
plaintiff for benefits covered by the uninsured motorists provision and
awarding Blakemore $100,000 plus pre-judgment interest and attorney's
fees. Furthermore the trial court severed the coverage question so that the
judgment could become final.270
Blakemore was operating his car incident to Army service when Brown
hit his vehicle. Brown was driving a military vehicle while in the course and
scope of his Army employment at the time of the incident. Undisputedly,
Blakemore sustained damages of at least $100,000.271 Brown did not carry
liability insurance applicable to the accident.
Relevant portions of the uninsured motorist provisions of the Brown's
policy provided that an "uninsured motor vehicle" did not include any vehi-
cle owned by a governmental body unless the operator of the vehicle lacked
insurance and no statute imposed liability for damage upon the govern-
ment.27 2 The court noted that according to Feres v. United States,273 the
government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service.274 Thus, as to Blakemore, no statute imposed liability on
267. James, 786 S.W.2d at 94.
268. Id.
269. 782 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ denied).
270. Id. at 277.
271. Id. at 278.
272. Id.
273. 340 U.S. 135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 156, 95 L. Ed. 152 (1950).
274. Id.
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the United States as a consequence of Brown's acts for the Blakemores' inju-
ries received incident to service. 275
While the appellate court refused to hold the policy ambiguous, the court
noted that where the language is subject to a more reasonable interpretation,
the construction which affords coverage will be adopted. 276 USAA con-
tended, however, that Blakemore was not legally entitled to recover from
Brown as that term is set forth in the uninsured motorist provision of the
policy. The court held that the qualification "legally entitled to recover"
goes to the ability to establish the uninsured driver's fault and the extent of
insured damages in order to recover and does not extend to the uninsured
motorist's statute of limitation defense or a governmental immunity
defense.277
Significantly, the court noted that the policy language would be rendered
absolutely meaningless by the adoption of an interpretion meaning that "le-
gally entitled to recover" conveyed the ability to sue the United States. If
the court stated that that interpretation were to be, there could never be a
situation wherein uninsured motorists could bring an uninsured claim
against the carrier for an accident with a government vehicle.278 Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the summary judgment of the trial court.279
6. Estoppel To Deny Coverage
In Hampton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.28 0 a truck
driven by Gloria Mahloch struck 8-year-old April Hampton on a residential
street. Hilda Hampton, April's mother, witnessed the incident. The
Mahlochs had liability insurance covering damages of up to $15,000 for each
person and $30,000 for each occurrence. The Mahlochs' insurance carrier
tendered their policy limits to settle the Hamptons' claim. The Hamptons'
attorney advised State Farm of the pendency of suit against the Mahlochs
and offered the opportunity to settle the action for the policy limits. The
Hamptons carried underinsured motorist coverage with State Farm which
had limits of $50,000 for each person and $100,000 for each incident.
State Farm's attorney responded to the Plaintiff that if the Hamptons re-
covered $30,000 from the Mahlochs, then the balance remaining under the
underinsured motorist coverage would only be $70,000. The letter con-
sented to the settlement with the Mahlochs and stated that the underinsured
motorist coverage would become inapplicable at such time as a settlement
with the Mahlochs was completed.
After settling with the Mahlochs, the Hamptons made a demand on State
Farm for payment of the balance of the underinsured motorist coverage.
State Farm, being represented by lawyers different from those previously
275. Blakemore, 782 S.W.2d at 278.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 279.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. 778 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
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handling the Hamptons' claim, filed a motion for summary judgment assert-
ing that the judgment settling the Mahloch suit precluded the assertion of
any claims against it. The Defendants also asserted that since Greg Hamp-
ton had not witnessed the incident causing the injuries to April, he lacked
any cause of action. The trial court denied the summary judgment motion
on the basis of res judicata but granted it as to the ground that April's father
had no cause of action for injuries.
The case proceeded to trial and the Hamptons sought damages from State
Farm for the injuries to Hilda Hampton in excess of insurance coverage af-
forded by the Mahlochs and within the limits of the State Farm's underin-
sured motorist coverage, as well as treble damages, breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the violations of the Texas De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act and the Texas Insurance Code. A jury found
both Gloria Ann Mahloch and April Hampton negligent and that their neg-
ligence proximately caused the occurrence. The jury further apportioned
the negligence sixty percent against Gloria Mahloch and forty per cent
against April Hampton. The jury awarded damages in the form of mental
anguish suffered by Mrs. Hampton of $25,000. In addition, it found that
State Farm had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing with regards
to policyholder Hilda Hampton. 281 The trial court, discarding the jury's
verdict, entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for State Farm.
The appellate court found that evidence existed sufficient to support the
jury's finding that Gloria was more negligent than April and a judgment
disregarding the negligence finding against Gloria was improper. Therefore,
the court concluded that the motion for judgment now was erroneously
granted and reversed.28 2
Finally, State Farm contended that res judicata precluded Hilda's recov-
ery because she had already been satisfied by the Mahloch judgment. The
Corpus Christi court of appeals found that State Farm's actions led the
Hamptons to believe that they would not forfeit their claim to recover the
coverage due from State Farm by accepting the policy limits from the
Mahlochs. Accordingly, the appellate court held State Farm estopped from
using a settlement obtained in this matter to preclude claim liability.28 3 The
appellate court therefore reversed the trial court and rendered judgment that
Hilda Hampton recover $50,000.00 from State Farm.284
7 Renewal after rejection of uninsured motorist coverage
Berry v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 285 involved an appeal
from summary judgments in favor of two insurance companies and a suit for
uninsured motorist benefits under four separate policies. Texas Farm Bu-
reau Mutual Insurance Company issued three of the policies and National
281. Id. at 478.
282. Id.
283. Hampton, 778 S.W.2d at 479.
284. Id. at 480.
285. 782 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ denied).
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County Mutual Insurance Company issued the fourth. Billy and Betty
Berry, the insureds under each policy, sued Texas Farm Bureau and Na-
tional County for uninsured motorist benefits after being injured by an unin-
sured motorist while occupying a vehicle jointly owned by the Berrys which
was insured only under National County's policy.
Texas Farm Bureau received a summary judgment on the ground that its
policies excluded any recovery for bodily injury sustained by an insured
while occupying an owned but unscheduled vehicle. The court based Na-
tional County's summary judgment on the ground that the automobile being
driven by the Berrys lacked uninsured motorists coverage because Betty
Berry, the named insured, had rejected such coverage on the original policy
and was suing on a renewal policy.
Texas Farm Bureau's three policies contained an exclusion that barred
recovery of uninsured motorist benefits by an insured who sustained bodily
injury while occupying an owned but uninsured vehicle. The Berrys con-
tended that the exclusion could not be enforced because it restricted the un-
insured motorist coverage mandated by article 5.06-1. The court noted that
since the decision in Holyfield Texas appellate courts have consistently up-
held the exclusion in suits involving uninsured motorist coverage.28 6 Thus,
the appellate court upheld the summary judgment granted to Texas Farm
Bureau based on the exclusion. 28 7
Under the National County policy, the declaration page stated that the
Berrys' automobile was not insured for uninsured or underinsured motorist
coverage. Article 5.06-1(1) provides in part that uninsured and underin-
sured motorist coverages does not apply if the named insured rejects the
coverage in writing. 288 Further, the uninsured motorist coverage does not
have to be included in renewal policies.28 9
The question presented to the court asked whether the policy in effect on
the date of the accident was a renewal policy as that term is used in article
5.06-1(1). Specifically the parties asked the court whether the legislature's
intent was to require a written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage on
every new, separate and distinct contract between the parties, although each
successive policy is connected in an unbroken chain of coverage back to the
original or initial policy on which uninsured motorist coverage was rejected.
The Berrys claimed that. each policy issued after the initial policy was an
original, not a renewal policy, because each had a new policy number and
was complete in and of itself. Furthermore, the declaration page of the pol-
icy stated that it was the "original policy declarations." Although the Ber-
rys originally rejected in writing underinsured motorist coverage in
286. Barry, 782 S.W.2d at 247 (citing Beaupre v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 736 S.W.2d 237,
239 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied); Broach v. Members Ins. Co., 647 S.W.2d
374 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); Equitable Gen. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 620
S.W.2d 608, 611 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
287. Id.
288. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(1) (Vernon 1981) (emphasis added).
289. Id.
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connection with the original policy issued by National County, a new writ-
ten rejection was not included in subsequent policies.
The court considered the general rule set forth in Great American Indem-
nity Co. v. State,290 which provides that a renewal of a policy constitutes a
separate and distinct contract for the period of time covered by the renewal,
except where the provisions of the extension certificate show that the pur-
pose and intention of the parties was not to make a new contract but was to
continue the original contract in force with such limitation found in clear
and unambiguous terms within the four comers of the certificate.2 91 The
court also looked to the accepted definitions of "renew," and determined
that the legislature intended the term "renewal policy" to include new con-
tracts that "begin again, .... recommence," "resume," "re-establish," "re-cre-
ate," and "replace" a preceding policy without a lapse of coverage.2 92
Accordingly, National County was not obligated to provide uninsured mo-
torist coverage in the policy sued on because Betty Berry had rejected such
coverage in writing in connection with the issuance of the initial policy pe-
riod.293 Thus, the summary judgments were affirmed. 294
Sims v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. 295 presented similar issues. The pol-
icy in question contained an endorsement in which the insured, Sims, ex-
pressly agreed that the statutorily required uninsured/underinsured
motorists and personal injury protection coverages would not apply when
the insured's vehicle was operated by her sister.296 When the insured sued
the insurer to recover for injuries she sustained as a passenger while her
sister was driving the insurer urged that the endorsement precluded its liabil-
ity as a matter of law.297 The insured agreed that although the insured may
validly reject both coverages in a written instrument, under the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Unigard Security Insurance Co. v. Schaefer,298
any attempt, short of complete rejection, to limit coverage under the policy's
personal injury protection benefits was statutorily impermissible. 299 The
court in Sims rejected this contention by noting that although the decision in
Unigard stated that coverage limitations other than written rejections were
invalid, the court in Unigard only considered the manner of the rejection
and not the scope of the rejection. 300 Accordingly, the court in Sims held
that the endorsement in which the insured expressly rejected personal injury
protection coverage when her sister operated the covered vehicle was valid
and consistent with article 5.06-3 even though it was not a total rejection.301
290. 229 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1950, writ ref'd).
291. Id.
292. 782 S.W.2d at 249.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. 781 S.W.2d 328, 329-31 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
296. Id. at 329-30.
297. Id. at 331-32.
298. 572 S.W.2d 307, 307 (Tex. 1978).
299. Sims, 781 S.W.2d at 329-30.
300. Id. at 331.
301. Id.
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Concerning the uninsured/underinsured motorists benefits, the insured
urged that the rejection endorsement was also invalid because it had not
been attached to the policy, either at the time it was originally issued or
when it was renewed.302 Although some evidence on this point presented
the possibility that the endorsement may not have been attached, the court
concluded that because the evidence was undisputed that the insured had
requested, agreed to, and signed the endorsement, the mere failure, if any, to
attach the endorsement to the policy did not affect its validity.30 3
B. Other Automobile Cases
1. Waiver of Forfeiture
Although a policy may be forfeited for the failure to pay premiums, an
insurer may waive the right to forfeit the policy if it engages in unequivocal
conduct inconsistent with that right.3°4 In Schachar v. Northern Assurance
Co. 305 the court expanded the circumstances constituting a waiver by hold-
ing that the mere retention of the policyholders' check and failure to notify
the policyholders that it had cancelled the policy was conduct sufficiently
inconsistent to relinquish the right to treat the policy as having been for-
feited.306 Shortly after mailing the original bill, the insurer notified the poli-
cyholders that their policy would be cancelled if payment was not received
within one week of the stated due date.30 7 On the due date, the policyhold-
ers mailed their payment by check to the insurer.308 When the insurer
presented the check for payment, the bank refused to honor it.3 9 The in-
surer, however, neither notified the policyholders nor returned the check un-
til after the cancellation date had passed and the policyholders' car had been
stolen.310 The court reasoned that the insurer, under these circumstances,
waived its right to forfeiture of the policy on the ground that retaining the
dishonored check, and, hence, the cause of action for collection together
with the failure to notify the policyholders that their policy had been can-
celled was inconsistent with treating the policy as having been canceled prior
to the theft.311
2. Persons Insured
In Neilson v. Allstate Insurance Co. 312 the court addressed the question of
302. Id.
303. Id. at 333 (citing Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Methven, 162 Tex. 323, 325, 346
S.W.2d 797, 800 (1961); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Columbus State Bank, 442 S.W.2d 479, 482
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1969, no writ)).
304. Bankers Life & Loan Ass'n. of Dallas v. Ashford, 139 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1940, no writ).
305. 786 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
306. Id. at 768, 769.
307. Id. at 768.
308. Id.
309. 786 S.W.2d at 766.
310. Id. at 767.
311. Id. at 768.
312. 784 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
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whether a deceased named insured's legal representative was insured under
an automobile policy renewed in the deceased insured's name after the
named insured's death. The policy in question provided that if the named
insured died during the policy period, the insured's legal representative was
insured under the policy to the extent of the representative's obligation to
use or maintain the deceased's automobile.3 13 The policy, however, ex-
pressly provided that coverage would end at the end of the policy period. 314
Finding this provision clear and unambiguous, the appellate court held that
the policy afforded no coverage to the legal representative of the deceased
who renewed the policy in the name of the deceased insured without advis-
ing the insurer of the insured's death.315 The court explained that adopting
a contrary rule would materially alter the insurer's risk as well as violate the
express terms of the policy. 316 The court also rejected the legal representa-
tive's contention that the insurer was estopped to deny coverage by having
accepted premium payments. 317 It explained that while doctrines of waiver
and estoppel may be invoked to prevent a forfeiture of policy benefits, they
may not be used to materially alter the nature of the risks covered by an
insurance policy.3 18
3. "Other Insurance" Clauses
In U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Aetna.Casualty & Surety Co.319 the primary
and excess insurers of a vehicle involved in a fatal collisior; settled the
wrongful death claim for an amount in excess of the limits of the primary
policy insuring the vehicle.320 The excess carrier then sued the driver's pri-
mary insurer to recover the amount paid in settlement on the theory that the
excess carrier's duty to contribute to the settlement did not arise until after
the driver's primary insurer had paid its policy limits. 321 The excess policy
provided that if insurance coverage was available under another policy other
than that "specifically purchased as being in excess of this policy," the excess
policy's coverage would be excess over such other insurance.322 Further, a
manuscript endorsement on the excess policy provided that the excess "pol-
icy [would] apply regardless of the existence of other insurance that would
apply on the same basis."' 323 The excess carrier argued that "insurance...
on the same basis" referred only to other true excess policies and, therefore,
its policy applied only in excess of all other primary policies. The driver's
313. Id. at 737.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 736.
316. 784 S.W.2d at 737.
317. Id.
318. Id.; see also Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Morse, 487 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex. 1972)(insurer not estopped by incontestability clause); Parchman v. United Library Life Ins. Co.,
640 S.W.2d 694, 697 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (beneficiary not
entitled to raise issue of waiver).
319. 781 S.W.2d 394 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
320. Id. at 395-96.
321. Id. at 396.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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primary carrier responded, however, that "insurance... on the same basis"
referred to any other insurance in excess of the primary coverage for the
vehicle, regardless of whether that policy was issued as primary or excess
insurance. On the basis of this interpretation, the primary carrier concluded
that the coverage afforded by the excess policy for the vehicle was prior to its
coverage because its other insurance clause declared that the driver's pri-
mary policy was in excess of any other applicable insurance. The court of
appeals agreed with the primary insurer holding that the primary policy was
in excess of the excess policy because the latter policy was "not the kind of
'umbrella' policy that comes into play only when all other... insurance has
been exhausted" but rather was one which "applie[d] when its underlying
insurance [was] exhausted. '3 24 The court reached this conclusion by treat-
ing the endorsement concerning "other insurance.., on the same basis" as
superceding rather than supplementing the "other insurance" clause in the
body of the excess policy. 325
The decision of the court is directly contrary to the decisions of the Hous-
ton's Fourteenth District court of appeals in Carrabba v. Employers Casualty
Co.,326 and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fire Insurance
Co.,327 in which the court specifically held that an excess policy is always
intended to be over and above true primary policies, regardless of the pres-
ence of excess "other insurance" clauses in such primary policies. 328
In United States Fire the court concluded that a manuscript endorsement
stating that the United States Fire policy would apply "regardless of the
existence of other insurance that would apply on the same basis" differed
from the language utilized in Liberty Mutual and Carrabba. The court
failed, however, to understand that both of those decisions make very clear
that insurance, which applies on the "same basis", means what it says: if the
policy is a true excess policy, then the other insurance referred to must itself
be true excess coverage. Both Liberty Mutual and Carrabba make clear that
a primary policy with an excess "other insurance" clause does not amount to
a true excess policy.
Another distinction attempted by the United States Fire court is based
upon the titling of the United States Fire policy as an "excess insurance
policy" and not an "umbrella" policy as in Carrabba. In truth, this distinc-
tion is entirely meritless. The court cites to no authority justifying this dis-
tinction in treatment. Indeed, the very policy provisions quoted by the court
from the U.S. Fire policy make clear that it is virtually identical in all re-
spects to the policies involved in Carrabba and Liberty Mutual, and, there-
fore, entitled to similar protection. The court's reading of the term "same
basis" completely ignores the context, the interpretation of an excess policy,
and is inconsistent with the policies set forth in Liberty Mutual and Car-
324. 751 S.W.2d at 399. Interestingly, the court confuses "excess" insurance, with true
"umbrella" insurance.
325. Id.
326. 742 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
327. 590 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
328. 742 S.W.2d at 715; 590 S.W.2d at 785.
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rabba which seek to protect excess carriers so that the availability of excess
coverage at low cost can be encouraged.
4. Scheduled Automobiles/Subrogation/Volunteer
In Foremost County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Home Indemnity Co. 329 the
court held that a general liability policy providing coverage for damages be-
cause of bodily injury "to which this insurance applies, caused by an occur-
rence and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use ...of any
automobile" is in no way restricted to only those automobiles listed on
schedules attached to the policy. 330 The court reasoned that the phrase "to
which this insurance applies" referred to "bodily injury," not to "any auto-
mobile." Thus, the schedule in the policy could not be incorporated into the
insuring agreement through that particular phrase. The court explained that
if the insured had intended to limit coverage to automobiles listed on the
schedule, it could have defined this specifically instead of simply stating "any
automobile. ' 331 The court also rejected arguments that the premium sched-
ule suggested that an automobile must be listed on the schedule in order to
be classified as an owned automobile. Again, the court urged that if the
result had been intended, policy language to this effect could have been used
and indeed was used in one of the other insurer's policies involved in the
case.
3 3 2
IV. PROPERTY INSURANCE
A. Rust or Corrosion Exclusion
National Fire Insurance Co. v. Valero Energy Corp. 333 involved a dispute
over a claim made by Valero Energy Corporation for losses due to faulty
design of a citrate scrubber. Due to defects and resulting damage, Valero
had to shut down its refinery several times between June 1983 and May 1984
in order to make repairs and alterations and to replace faulty components.
National Union denied the ten-million-dollar claim based on exclusions in its
policy for loss caused by rust or corrosion and for costs of making good
faulty workmanship, materials, construction or design. 334 The court found
that the exclusion for rust damage did not apply because the evidence
showed that sudden and unexpected corrosion occurred as a result of faulty
design, rather than by the gradual natural deterioration causing ordinary
329. 897 F.2d. 754 (5th Cir. 1990).
330. Id. at 756.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. 777 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
334. The text of the exclusions was as follows:
(h) Loss or damage caused by rust, corrosion, frost or freezing unless resulting
from a peril insured against;...
(j) Cost of making good faulty workmanship, materials, construction or de-
sign, but this exclusion shall not be deemed to exclude physical loss or dam-
age arising as a consequence of faulty workmanship, material, construction
or design; ....
777 S.W.2d at 505.
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rust. It concluded, therefore, that since faulty design was a peril insured
against by the policy, the corrosion damage fell within coverage due to an
exception to the exclusion for damage resulting from "a peril insured
against. ' 335 The court also concluded that the exclusion for the costs of
"making good" faulty design did not apply due to an exception in the policy
to the exclusion for physical damage arising as a consequence of faulty de-
sign. It noted that the loss could be characterized in two ways: as loss
caused by Valero's need to replace an inadequate transition piece and demis-
ters, and as physical damage to the transition piece and demisters that was a
consequence of the faulty design and inadequacy of the components, necessi-
tating the replacement. 336 Without finding specifically that the exclusion
was ambiguous, the court stated that it must adopt the construction of an
exclusion clause that favors the insured as long as that construction is not
unreasonable. 337 The court concluded that the loss must therefore be char-
acterized as one sustained as a consequence of faulty design, bringing it
within the exception to the exclusion and thus within the coverage of the
policy. 338
The court also found that the trial court did not err in submitting a special
issue of coverage under the policy to the jury in broad form.339 The court
stated that it was proper for the trial court to submit instructions to the jury
explaining the conditions under which the exclusions and exceptions to the
exclusions would affect coverage under the policy. National Union had sub-
mitted an instruction with one of its own special issues, but the court of
appeals found that the tendered instruction incorrectly instructed the jury to
deny coverage if it found that damage to the transition piece resulted from
corrosion and did not explain the exception contained in the exclusion for
corrosion damage caused by "a peril insured against." 34° The court also
held that the trial court did not err in submitting the issue of compensatory
damages in one broad form issue, adding that the trial court should have
given instructions explaining the correct formula for calculating damages
under the policy. Such damage instructions, however, were not requested by
National Union in the proper form. Although National Union had submit-
ted instructions accompanying its own requested special issues, which were
not submitted to the jury, the appellate court held that the trial court should
not be required to pick through a party's own tendered instructions to con-
struct an instruction to conform to an issue actually submitted.341 Rather,
National Union should have objected to the charge and tendered instruc-
335. Id. at 506.
336. Id.
337. Id. (citing Blaylock v. American Guar. Bank Liab. Ins. Co., 632 S.W.2d 719, 721
(Tex. 1982); Glover v. National Ins. Underwriters, 545 S.W.2d 755, 761 (Tex. 1977)).
338. 777 S.W.2d at 506.
339. The first special issue asked the jury: "Did a loss occur which was covered and paya-
ble under the policy?" The jury answered this issue affirmatively. The second special issue
asked the jury: "What was the amount of such loss, if any, payable under the policy?" Thejury answered $10,000,000. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
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tions on the proper measure of damages in substantially correct form as to
the issues submitted by the court.342
B. Appraisal
In Hartford Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Teachworth343 the Fifth Circuit de-
termined that a provision in an insurance policy providing for appraisal was
not an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA). The insured, Teachworth, made claims for hurricane and freeze
damage under his Texas multi-peril insurance policy issued by Hartford
Lloyd's. When Teachworth and Hartford could not agree on the extent of
the damage, Teachworth invoked the appraisal provision in his policy.344
Teachworth's appraiser estimated the total loss at approximately $4,154,681,
while Hartford's appraiser arrived at a figure of approximately $1,419,951.
Pursuant to the policy, the appraisers submitted their differences to an um-
pire appointed by a Galveston County judge. The umpire agreed in large
part with Teachworth's appraiser. The two of them rendered a written ap-
praisal award in the amount of $3,770,043. Hartford then filed a declaratory
judgment action alleging the invalidity of the award because Teachworth's
appraiser had not acted impartially and because Teachworth had acted
fraudulently during the appraisal process. The trial court determined that
the appraisal award was an arbitration award governed by the FAA, and
accordingly reviewed the award under sections 10 and 11 of that statute,
which circumscribe a court's authority to vacate or modify an arbitration
award. The court determined that these sections did not give Hartford the
right to a jury trial on the validity of the award, so the validity of the award
was tried to the bench, which affirmed on appeal.345 Hartford then argued
that the FAA did not apply to appraisal awards. The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that insurance appraisals and arbitrations have significant differences be-
cause appraisals are informal and typically involve the appraisers conducting
their own independent investigation and basing their decisions on their own
knowledge to determine only the amount of loss, while arbitrations are
quasi-judicial proceedings that involve formal. hearings, notice to parties,
342. Id.
343. 898 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990).
344. The appraisal provision read as follows:
Appraisal... In case the insured and this Company shall fail to agree as to the
actual cash value or the amount of loss, then, on the written demand of either,
each shall select a competent and disinterested appraiser and notify the other of
the appraiser selected within twenty days of such demand. The appraisers shall
further select a competent and disinterested umpire; and failing for fifteen days
to agree upon such umpire, then, on request of the insured, or this Company,
such umpire shall be selected by a judge of a district court of a judicial district
where the loss occurred. The appraisers shall then appraise the loss, stating
separately actual cash value and loss to each item: and, failing to agree, shall
submit their differences, only, to the umpire. An award in writing, so itemized,
of any two when filed with this Company shall determine the amount of actual
cash value and loss. Each appraiser shall be paid by the party selecting him and
the expenses of appraisal and umpire shall be paid by the parties equally.
Id. at 1059.
345. Id.
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and testimony of witnesses, and may resolve the entire controversy between
parties or merely legal or factual disputes. The court ruled that the insur-
ance appraisal provision in the policy was not an arbitration agreement and
therefore that the district court misapplied the FAA, harming Hartford by
denying it a jury trial on the validity of the award, applying the wrong stan-
dards in assessing that validity, and making factual findings under FAA
standards that defeated Hartford's policy coverage defenses. 3" The decision
was therefore remanded to federal district court for a review of the appraisal
under Texas law. 3 47
C. Limitations
In Bazile v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co. 348 L.N. Bazile sued four insurance
companies for denying her claim for a fire loss that occurred on April 17,
1981. Bazile hired a public adjusting firm and an attorney to assist her in
filing her claim. The adjuster filed the proofs of loss with the various insur-
ers on August 8, 1981. Three days later, an agent acting on behalf of all four
companies rejected the proofs of loss as not timely filed as required by the
policies. More than three years later Bazile filed suit. The trial court
granted summary judgment on limitations grounds, finding the suit barred
under the provisions of the policies that required suit to be brought within a
specific time.349 The appellate court held that contractual provisions which
limit the time in which to file suit are valid and enforceable. It rejected
Bazile's apparent contention that the limitation period did not begin to run
because the proofs of loss were not received and accepted by the insurers,
holding that the cause of action accrued sixty days after the proofs of loss
were rejected, and the limitation period began to run at that time, thus bar-
ring Bazile's 1984 lawsuit.
D. Rights Against Guarantors
In Lexington Insurance Co. v. Gray350 guarantors of a promissory note
sued Lexington Insurance Company to determine their liability to Lexing-
346. Id. at 1061-62.
347. Id. at 1063.
348. 784 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ dism'd). The Texas
Supreme Court originally granted writ on this case, but later withdrew consideration and or-
dered the writ dismissed.
349. Of the three insurance contracts of insurers that were parties to this appeal, all pro-
vided in part as follows:
The amount of loss for which this Company may be liable shall be payable sixty
days after proof of loss, as herein provided, is received by this Company and
ascertainment of the loss is made either by agreement between the insured and
this Company expressed in writing or by the filing with this Company of an
award as herein provided.
No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable
in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have
been complied with, and unless commenced within two years and one day next
after cause of action accrues.
Id. at 74.
350. 775 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
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ton, which insured the property subject to the note. The property had been
destroyed by fire, and litigation had established that the property owner had
commited arson and therefore was not entitled to recover under Lexington's
policy. The lender, InterFirst Bank of Austin, filed this suit against Lexing-
ton and Gray, one of the guarantors, claiming that the bank was entitled to
the insurance proceeds and that Gray was liable to the bank under his guar-
anty agreement. Eight days after suit was fied, Lexington paid the bank the
whole principal due on the note, with interest. The bank then dismissed its
claim and executed an assignment and assignment of deed of trust, giving
Lexington all its rights in the mortgage and other securities as provided in
the standard mortgage clause under the policy. Lexington and Gray, with
the other guarantors who intervened, filed claims against each other. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the guarantors.
The appellate court found that where the parties had in effect agreed in
advance that the matter would be governed by contract principles instead of
equitable principles, there was no reason for the equitable principles usually
found in subrogation cases to come into play. 351 The court held that in a
case such as the one before it, in which the mortgagee had, pursuant to a
standard mortgage clause, fully assigned the mortgage debt and collateral to
an insurer that had paid the entire indebtedness, the relative equities of the
party had little, if any, effect on the insurer's right to recover from a third
party who owed the mortgagee indemnity but who was innocent of any neg-
ligence or other wrongdoing with regard to the original damage or loss to
the collateral. Therefore, the court held that the guarantors had not proven
as a matter of law that they lacked liability to Lexington under subrogation
or assignment. 352
The court also rejected the guarantors' language in the bank's motion to
dismiss, stating that payment by Lexington had "fully discharged the liabil-
ity of any party, including ... Gray." The appellate court held that because
Lexington's payment and the bank's assignment to Lexington occurred
351. The standard mortgage clause found in the policy provided that any reimbursement
by Lexington for loss or damage would be payable to the "mortgagee (or trustee) as [its]
interest may appear, and this insurance, as to the interest of the mortagee (or trustee) only
therein, shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within
described property." This clause also provided that
[WIhenever this Company shall pay the mortgagee (or trustee) any sum for loss
or damage under the policy and shall claim that as to the mortgagor or owner
no liability therefore existed, this Company shall to the extent of such payment,
be thereupon legally subrogated to all the rights of the party to whom such
payment shall be made, under all securities held as collateral to the mortgage
debt, or may at its option, pay to the mortgagee (or trustee) the whole principal
due or to grow due on the mortgage with interest accrued thereon to the date of
such payment, and shall thereupon receive a full assignment and transfer of the
mortgage and on all such other securities.
Id. at 681. The court stated that this clause provided two options in the event of damage to the
property securing the indebtedness to the mortgagee, under circumstances in which the insurer
has no liability to the mortgagor: 1) the insurer could pay the mortgagee the amount of the loss
or damage and thereupon be "legally subrogated" to all that party's rights; or 2) the insurer
could pay the entire principal due or to become due on the note, with interest, and receive a
full assignment and transfer of the mortgage. This case involved the second option.
352. Id. at 687.
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nearly two weeks before the filing of the motion to dismiss, and the guaran-
tors presented insufficient summary judgment evidence to show that the
bank had any remaining authority to release the guarantors from liability on
the note and that as a result there was at the very least a material fact issue
as to the bank's power to declare the note discharged and release the guaran-
tors.353 The court also found the record inadequate to conclude that a col-
lateral estoppel defense was established as a matter of law because it lacked
the pleadings from the Missouri federal court suit filed against Lexington by
the insured and therefore could not determine what theory of damages were
pursued by Lexington in that court. 354
V. LiFE INSURANCE
A. Accidental Death
The Fifth Circuit, in Chen v. Metropolitan Insurance & Annuity Co.,35
addressed the issue of whether an individual, who died of alcohol poisoning,
died as a result of an accident. On September 18, 1986 Ching Sing Lee died
as a result of drinking too much brandy. Lee and a companion had been
drinking American alcohol in a Chinese fashion, drinking ice tea glasses of
brandy in two or three swallows. The life insurance policy contained an
accidental death rider that provided payment in the amount of $100,000 if
"the insured died, directly and independently of all other causes, as the re-
sult of an accident. ' '356
Relying upon Republic National Life Insurance Co. v. Heyward,357 the
Fifth Circuit noted that the question of whether something is an accident
depends upon the reasonable anticipation of the insured viewed from the
insured's standpoint. In analyzing the standard, the court noted that it is
common knowledge that one who goes rock climbing, or bear hunting, or
hang gliding, may die. The question is, however, whether the person en-
gaged in the activity should have reasonably believed the activity would
cause his death.358 Turning to the facts of the case, the Fifth Circuit held
that it was improper for the trial court to rule as a matter of law that Lee
should have reasonably foreseen that death was the natural and probable
consequence of his ingesting the amount of brandy that he did.359
In what appears to be dictum, the Fifth Circuit went on to construe an
exclusion of the policy for death that is caused or contributed to directly or
indirectly by the use of any drug without the advice of a licensed medical
practitioner.36" While recognizing that dictionaries and scientific journals
typically categorize alcohol as a drug, the court noted that the beneficiaries'
353. Id. at 688.
354. Id.
355. 907 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1990).
356. Id. at 567.
357. 536 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1976).
358. 907 F.2d at 568.
359. Id. at 567-68.
360. From the wording of the opinion it is difficult to determine whether this is dictum or
not. Apparently, the trial court based its summary judgment for the insurer in part upon this
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definition suggested a distinction between "alcohol" and "drug." Applying
proper rules of construction, the court determined that it must accept a rea-
sonable construction that favors the insured if one exists. Consequently, the
court construed the term "drug" in the policy so as not to include alcohol
within the meaning of that term.
B. Application Misrepresentations - Delivery of Application to Insured
In Wise v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. 361 the Fifth Circuit considered
whether an insurer may avoid liability on a life insurance policy because of
misrepresentations made on the application for the policy. Judge Reavley,
writing for the court, noted that typically an insurer may not rely upon such
misrepresentations unless a copy of the application has been delivered to the
policy holder. After examining Texas case law and the insurance statutes,
the court determined that Texas recognizes an exception to the rule that an
application must accompany the policy for life insurance. Consequently, the
court determined that the failure to attach or deliver a copy of the applica-
tion with the life insurance policy to the policy holder prior to his death
would not prevent the insurer from relying upon the misrepresentations so
as to avoid liability on the life insurance policy. 362
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Brandt363 Dow Chemical Company
employed Robert Brandt as a pilot and held a life insurance policy for his
benefit through American Home Assurance Company. After Brandt died in
an airplane crash, the beneficiary sought to recover upon the policy, but
American Home relied upon an exclusion in the policy that provided that
employees would not be covered for air travel if acting as a pilot or a crew
member.364 The central issue in the trial court concerned whether Brandt
acted as a pilot of the plane at the time of the crash. The issue submitted to
the jury placed the burden of proof to show that the exclusion was operative
upon American Home. American Home contended that the burden was
upon the insured to show that the occurrence did not fall within the
exclusion.
The court of appeals, after examining the issue submitted, held that "once
an insurer pleads an exception to the insurance policy coverage, the burden
then shifts to the insured to show that the occurrence did not fall within the
exception or exclusion of the policy. '365 Such a holding is consistent with
prior case law in Texas and with Texas Civil Procedure Rule 94.366 While
such a rule is consistent with Texas procedure and contract law, the rule is
contrary to that in most jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions the insurance
exclusion. However, in a footnote the court noted that Metropolitan had not pursued this
exclusion as a basis for denying the accidental death benefits. 907 F.2d at 567 n.l.
361. 894 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1990).
362. Id. at 141-42.
363. 778 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
364. Id. at 142.
365. Id. at 143.
366. See Shaver v. National Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1962); TEx.
R. Civ. P. 94.
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company typically bears the burden of proving that a policy exclusion is
applicable. 367
C. Gross Negligence and Willfulness
The Houston fourteenth district court of appeals considered the question
of whether gross negligence constitutes willfulness under the forfeiture pro-
vision of life insurance proceeds in the insurance code in Rumbaut v.
Labagnara.3 68 The insured's sons by a previous marriage sought to deny the
insured's husband the benefit of life insurance proceeds because the sons al-
leged that the husband had "willfully" caused their mother's death. In its
charge to the jury, the court defined willfully in a disjunctive manner as
meaning a desire to bring about the physical results of the act or believing
such results were substantially certain to follow, or to mean more than inten-
tional conduct which results from momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence
or error of judgment.3 69 In considering the definition, the court of appeals
determined that the definition violated the Texas Supreme Court's definition
in Greer v. Franklin Life Insurance Co.370 In Greer the Court determined
that "willfully" requires more than the beneficiary's intent that the death of
the insured result from his or her act. It additionally requires the factor of
illegality.371
After determining that the definition given by the trial court was incor-
rect, the court of appeals examined whether the evidence was legally suffi-
cient to support a finding of willfulness so as to determine whether it must
remand or whether it could render a verdict. The evidence disclosed that the
husband and wife set sail in the Gulf of Mexico during the height of hurri-
cane season while neither had experience aboard a sailboat, that the wife had
limited swimming skills and that the ship was in poor condition. The evi-
dence also demonstrated that the appellant was in debt without a means to
pay off the debt because he had quit work. Based upon this evidence, the
court of appeals determined that there was some evidence of willfulness so as
to require a remand of the cause to the trial court.372 The dissent, written by
Chief Justice Curtiss Brown, argued that the evidence was no evidence,
either direct or circumstantial. He concluded that "evidence that this was a
two person 'ship of fools' will not meet the test."'3 73
D. Temporary Life Insurance
In Tam Nu La v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 374 the Houston fourteenth
district court of appeals considered the question of whether or not an insured
was covered by temporary life insurance during the time in which his appli-
367. A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES § 9.01, at 442-43 & n.2 (2d ed. 1988).
368. 791 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
369. Id. at 196.
370. 148 Tex. 166, 221 S.W.2d 857 (1949).
371. 221 S.W.2d at 859.
372. 791 S.W.2d at 199.
373. Id. at 200 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
374. 781 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ dism'd).
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cation for life insurance was being processed. Nguu Huynh applied for life
insurance on October 14, 1986. At that time, because he could not afford to
pay the premium, he postdated his check for the premium amount to Octo-
ber 30, 1986. Mr. Huynh died October 29, 1986. The widow of the de-
ceased then brought suit claiming benefits under a temporary insurance
provision in the application. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Aetna based on nonpayment of the premium and on the ground of
material misrepresentation in the application.
The court of appeals determined that there was a material fact issue re-
garding the intent of the decedent as to whether his check was for payment
for temporary insurance. With regard to the misrepresentation in the appli-
cation, the court noted that the misrepresentation appeared in a document
entitled "Agent's Report." The court of appeals determined that the misrep-
resentation as to the amount of life insurance already in force was not estab-
lished to be a part of the life insurance application. Consequently, the court
of appeals determined that summary judgment was improper.375
E. Application Misrepresentations as a Defense to DTPA
and Insurance Code Violations
In Koral Industries, Inc. v. Security-Connecticut Life Insurance Co.376
Koral sought to obtain a new key-man life insurance policy on the life of
Lewis Lindsey from Security-Connecticut because the rates offered by Secur-
ity-Connecticut were lower than those of Koral's current carrier. In filling
out the application, Lindsey did not disclose that he had been hospitalized
on three separate occasions and that he had received counseling and treat-
ment regarding depression and the excessive use of alcohol. Security-Con-
necticut issued a $1 million insurance policy naming Koral as the beneficiary
and as a result of the newly issued policy, Koral allowed its prior policy to
expire. In 1986 Lindsey died, and Koral submitted a claim for payment of
the policy proceeds. Security-Connecticut discovered Lindsey's omissions
and misrepresentations in the application for insurance and thereafter denied
payment.
Koral brought suit against Security-Connecticut for breach of a duty of
good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA), and violations of the Insurance Code. After trial to a jury, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of Koral on all causes of action except for
the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for statutory viola-
tions. Both parties appealed. On appeal, Security-Connecticut argued that
it had no liability based upon the jury's answers regarding the fraudulent
misrepresentations. Security-Connecticut argued that the jury's affirmative
answer that Security-Connecticut knew facts which would have put it on
inquiry regarding the omissions from the application should be disregarded.
After a review of the applicable Texas authority, the court of appeals held
375. Id. at 634.
376. 788 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), writ denied per curiam, 802 S.W.2d 650
(Tex. 1990).
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that the great weight of Texas authority provides that an insurer must have
actual knowledge of the misrepresentation before the insured may avoid a
defense based on those false representations. In other words, a finding that
the insurer "should have known" of the fraud or misrepresentation will be
insufficient to preVent an insurer from avoiding liability on a policy in which
the insured has made material misrepresentations. 377
Koral argued that the misrepresentation defense should only be a valid
defense against the breach of contract cause of action and that the other
causes of action, DTPA and breach of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing, are extracontractual and unaffected by the jury's finding of fraud by
Lindsey. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that "a recovery by Koral
based on its other causes of action would be inherently inconsistent with the
denial of recovery on its breach of contract cause of action.1378 Conse-
quently, the court indicated that the defense of misrepresentation is sufficient
to avoid liability under the Insurance Code or for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing as well as to avoid a breach of contract action.
VI. HEALTH, LiFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
A. ERISA Preemption
Several cases during the survey period address ERISA preemption of state
law claims. In Frankoff v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. 379 the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Mutual Life in a declaratory judg-
ment action based upon the ERISA preemption. 380 The appellate court,
however, addressed whether ERISA applied by considering whether the in-
sured was an employee and thus a "participant" under the ERISA stat-
utes.38' Mr. Frankoff was a sole practicing attorney who had procured
health insurance under a professional group insurance trust.3 8 2 Mr.
Frankoff counterclaimed against Mutual Life after it filed a declaratory judg-
ment action for cancellation of the policy. 383 Mutual Life denied a claim
because of the alleged omissions of Mrs. Frankoff's medical condition.38 4
Mutual Life obtained summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's state law
cause of action because of the ERISA preemption.385
The appellate court reversed the summary judgment, holding that the evi-
dence establishing the status of Mr. Frankoff lacked sufficiency to consider
him an ERISA participant as a matter of law.38 6 In rendering its holding,
the court relied in part on Peckham v. Board of Trustees,387 which held that
377. Id. at 146.
378. Id. at 147.
379. 792 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
380. Id. at 764.
381. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
382. 792 S.W.2d at 765.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
386. 792 S.W.2d at 766.
387. 653 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1981).
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a sole proprietor could not enroll himself along with his employees, thereby
creating a dual status.38 8 The court further held that it was the insurer's
burden to adduce summary judgment evidence establishing Mr. Frankoff as
an employee/participant as defined under ERISA.38 9
In another case a federal district court held that the ERISA preemption
applied to claims under articles 3.62 and 21.21 of the Texas Insurance
Code.390 In Multicare Health Care Services, Inc. v. General American Life
Insurance Co. 391 the Court held, without much discussion, that the relief
afforded under article 3.62 is preempted by ERISA.392
In addressing article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code, the court con-
cluded that this article is a law regulating insurance within the meaning of
the ERISA savings clause.393 The "savings clause" provides that "nothing
in the subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities. '3 94
The court nevertheless held that the intent of the civil enforcement provi-
sions of ERISA395 is that they provide the exclusive vehicle for participants
and beneficiaries to bring suit for improper processing of claims under an
ERISA plan.396 Accordingly, the court held that "actions under State stat-
utes which regulate unfair or deceptive insurance practices are preempted by
ERISA when the actions are brought by plan participants or
beneficiaries." 397
In a related matter, the court also held that Multicare, as an assignee of
the benefits of the insured, had standing to pursue this cause of action
against General American under ERISA.398
In Pan American Life Insurance Co. v. Erbauer Construction Corp.399 the
court held that ERISA preemption amounts to an affirmative defense that
can be waived by a defendant who does not plead the defense and does not
offer evidence or obtain findings in the trial court regarding the preemp-
tion.40 In rendering its holding, the court followed its prior holding in Cas-
388. 792 S.W.2d at 766.
389. The court also hinted that it would be wise to include the pertinent provisions of the
subject policy in the summary judgment evidence. Id.
390. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62, 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
391. 720 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
392. Id. at 582. Article 3.62 provides that an insurer that fails to pay a loss within 30 days
after the demand is liable for the amount of the loss, 12% damages on the amount of the loss,
and reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution and collection of said loss. TEx. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 3.62 (Vernon Supp. 1990). This court had previously held that article 3.62 is pre-
empted in Juckett v. Beecham Home Improvement Prod., Inc., 684 F. Supp. 448, 451-52
(N.D. Tex. 1988).
393. 720 F. Supp at 582.
394. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
395. 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
396. 720 F. Supp. at 582.
397. Id. (citing Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 493-94 (9th Cir.
1988)). The court in Kanne held that ERISA preempted § 790.03(H) of the California Insur-
ance Code, which provides a cause of action for unfair insurance practices similar to article
21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code.
398. 720 F. Supp. at 581-82.
399. 791 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
400. Id. at 149.
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tillio v. Neely's TBA Dealer Supply, Inc.40 1 and the Dallas court of appeals
opinion of Great North American Stationers v. Ball.402
Erbauer and these two decisions follow a line of cases that hold that the
application of the ERISA preemption is a choice-of-law question which can
be waived if not timely asserted. 4° 3 A cogent dissenting opinion in Erbauer
addresses the ERISA preemption issue with informative detail.4° 4 The dis-
sent explains that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in certain
circumstances under ERISA, while in other situations, the federal and state
courts have concurrent jurisdictions. 4° 5 Generally, federal and state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction in claims brought by a participant or a benefici-
ary406 to recover benefits under the plan, to enforce rights under the terms of
the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits under the plan.4° 7 The dissent
holds that most claims under ERISA fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts, particularly those brought by a fiduciary.408 Because
Erbauer's claim against Pan American resulted from Pan American's alleged
improper handling of Erbauer's benefit claims, it was analogous to a breach
of fiduciary duty that could be brought by a fiduciary as defined in ER-
ISA.409 Accordingly, the dissenting opinion stated that the case should be
reversed because the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Erbauer's claims.410
In Brown v. Granatelli411 the Tuneup Masters Employee Benefit Plan
(Plan) provided group health care benefits for employees of Tuneup Masters
and their families, including the Browns.412 Mr. Granatelli, the owner of
Tuneup Masters, purchased excess or "stop loss" insurance from North
America Life and Casualty Co. (NALAC). 413 Under this "stop loss" insur-
ance, NALAC was to reimburse the Plan for claims the Plan pays which
401. 776 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App.-Houston (st Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
402. 770 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
403. See Dueringer v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 127, 129-30 (5th Cir. 1988);
Castilo, 776 S.W.2d at 294; Ball, 770 S.W.2d at 633.
404. Erbauer, 791 S.W.2d at 159-60 (Dunn, J., dissenting).
405. Id. at 159.
406. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)-(8) (1988). ERISA defines "participant" as:
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a
benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of
such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive any such benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1988). ERISA further defines "beneficiary" as a "person designated by a
participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a
benefit thereunder." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8).
407. 791 S.W.2d at 159 (Dunn, J., dissenting); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988).
408. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988).
409. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1132(a)(2) (1988).
410. Id. This dissenting opinion also has an excellent discussion as to the type of state laws
that are preempted by ERISA as well as who has standing to sue under ERISA. Erbauer, 791
S.W.2d at 155-159 (Dunn, J., dissenting).
411. 897 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Texas law).
412. Id. at 1352.
413. Id. at 1353.
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exceeds $30,000 for any covered individual during the policy year.4 14 The
Plan was amended to exclude coverage for all newborn babies until the
thirty-first day after birth. Also excluded was coverage for any baby that
was disabled, hospitalized, or sick on that thirty-first day.41 5
The Browns incurred significant medical expenses because of physical
problems and birth defects of two premature babies. After the Browns filed
suit in state court against the Plan and Granatelli, the defendants removed
the case to federal court and joined NALAC as third-party defendant. The
Browns thereafter sought summary judgment on the basis that article 3.70-
2(E) of the Texas Insurance Code4 16 required the Plan and NALAC's policy
to provide coverage for newborns.417 The court granted summary judgment
for the defendants, holding that ERISA preempted article 3.70-2(E) and the
Plan was not structurally defective.418
The parties stipulated to various facts, apparently one of which was that
the Plan was an Employee Benefit Plan within the meaning of ERISA.419
The Fifth Circuit court of appeals alfirmed the district court and held that
article 3.70-2(E) does not apply to the "stop-gap" insurance purchased by
the Plan.4 20 The court reasoned that stop loss insurance was not "accident
and sickness" insurance as addressed in article 3.70-2(E).4 21 Furthermore,
the court held that because of ERISA's "deemer clause," the state is pre-
empted from requiring the plan to include losses because of newborns with
congenital defects. 422 The court then reasoned that the Plan's payments to
beneficiaries "cannot be considered insurance payments. ' 423
,The Court in Brown further held that the "stop loss" policy that the Plan
purchased does not qualify as a either an individual or a group policy be-
cause the Plan was the beneficiary, not individuals.4 24 Accordingly, article
3.70-2(E) is not applicable because its mandates apply only when a policy's
414. Id. NALAC had no authority to approve or disapprove claims submitted, to manage
the Plan, or to approve changes in the Plan itself. Id.
415. Id. at 1353.
416. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.70-2(E) (Vernon 1981).
417. 897 F.2d at 1353.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 1352. Article 3.70-2(E) provides, in pertinent part, that:
No individual policy or group policy of accident and sickness insurance...
delivered or issued for delivery to any person in this state which provides for
accident and sickness coverage of additional newborn children or maternity ben-
efits, may be issued in this state if it contains any provisions excluding or limit-
ing initial coverage of a newborn infant for a period of time, or limitations or
exclusions for congenital defects of a newborn child.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.70-2(E) (Vernon 1981).
420. 897 F.2d at 1353.
421. Id. at 1354; Cuttle v. Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, 623 F. Supp. 1154,
1157 (D. Me. 1985); cf. United Food & Commercial Workers & Employers Arizona Health &
Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1986).
422. 897 F.2d at 1353-54. The "deemer clause" provides, in pertinent part, that no Em-
ployee Benefit Plan shall be deemed to be an insurance company... or to be engaged in the
business of insurance.., for purposes of any law of any state purporting to regulate insurance
companies. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988).
423. 897 F.2d at 1355.
424. Id.
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primary coverage is for health and accident coverage. The "stop loss" policy
was purchased primarily to cover the Plan's catastrophic losses. The court
carefully warned that employers could not avoid the mandates of article
3.70-2(E) by merely naming an employee benefit plan as the insured on a
policy that, in essence, actually insures the Plan's participants.425
B. Application of Article 21.21 to Employer's Benefit Program
In Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. v. Gentry426 the court held that an em-
ployee could not maintain a cause of action under article 21.21 of the Texas
Insurance Code427 against her employer, who was not a subscriber to the
Texas Worker's Compensation Act.428 In Gentry, the employer provided
the Plaintiff an employee handbook that listed "Worker's Compensation" as
an employee benefit.4 29 After the employer denied Mrs. Gentry's claims for
compensation for an on-the-job injury, she brought suit for violations of arti-
cle 21.21, breach of contract and negligence.430 The court held that the em-
ployers' benefit program was incidental to its business of nursing home
care.431 Accordingly, it held that article 21.21 would not apply because it
was enacted to regulate trade practices in the "business of insurance. '432
C. Policy Exclusion
In Pierce v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co.4 33 the accident insurance pol-
icy excluded, inter alia, an accident or loss caused, or contributed to, by a
hernia of any kind.4 34 The insured suffered a hernia from lifting a fifty
pound bag from the trunk of a car.435 The insured alleged that Benefit Trust
was not entitled to summary judgment because the exclusion was ambigu-
ous. The insured alleged that the loss was not caused by a hernia, but rather
by the lifting incident.436
The court disagreed, holding that the exclusion was not ambiguous and
that the hernia did not result from an "accident. '437 The court reasoned
that the insured had intentionally lifted the bag from the car; therefore, the
hernia was not a result of an accident, although it was unexpected and
425. Id. Justice Brown issued a cogent dissenting opinion wherein he argues, inter alla, that
the "stop loss" insurance policy is a policy subject to article 3.70-2(E) because it effectively
reimburses employees for certain eligible expenses, and because the parents of the children are
necessary third-party beneficiaries of the "stop loss" protection of the Plan. Id. at 1357
(Brown, J., dissenting).
426. 787 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
427. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Vernon Supp. 1990).
428. Id. at 606-07.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 607.
432. Id.
433. 784 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied).
434. Id. at 517.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 518.
437. Id.
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unintended. 438
D. Misrepresentation
In Soto v. Southern Life & Health Insurance Co.439 the court held that in
Texas there is no affirmative defense of negligent misrepresentation concern-
ing the avoidance of life insurance policies.440 Mrs. Soto brought suit
against Southern Life for proceeds under a life insurance policy insuring her
deceased husband. 441 Southern Life pleaded and proved the affirmative de-
fenses of misrepresentations and fraud.442 The trial court submitted a jury
question asking whether Mr. Soto was negligent in misrepresenting his
health in response to questions on the application." 3 The Corpus Christi
court of appeals held that this submission constituted error because, under
Texas law, the insurer must plead and prove that the insurer willfully and
intentionally made a material misrepresentation. 4 Accordingly, a negli-
gence issue on misrepresentation was improper. The court held, neverthe-
less, that this error was harmless because the jury also affirmatively found in
a separate question in the charge that Mr. Soto knew that representations
were false and that they were intended to deceive Southern Life into issuing
him a life insurance policy.445 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment." 6
438. Id. (citing Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. 1973)).
439. 776 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
440. Id. at 756.
441. Id. at 753-54.
442. Id. at 755.
443. Id. at 756.
444. Id. (citing Allen v. American Nat. Ins. Co. , 380 S.W.2d 604, 607-08 (Tex. 1964);
Republic-Vanguard Life Ins. Co. v. Walter, 728 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. App. Houston, [ist
Dist.] 1987 no writ); Allied Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. De La Cerda, 584 S.W.2d 529, 533-34
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Beynum v. Signal Life Ins. Co., 522 S.W.2d
696, 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Haney v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 505 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
essential elements of a misrepresentation affirmative defense to avoid the insurance policy are
the following: "I) the making of a representation by the insured; 2) the falsity of the represen-
tation; 3) reliance thereon by the insurer; 4) intent to deceive on the part of the insured; and 5)
the materiality of the representation." 776 S.W.2d at 756 (citing Mayes v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 608 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. 1980); Southern Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Medrano,
698 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
445. 776 S.W.2d at 756.
446. Id.
